No: it exceeds it by two; we do not say that it differs: how could it differ by a "two" in the "three"? We may add that neither can Motion differ from Motion by Motion.There is, in short, no parallel in any of the other genera.
In the case of virtue and vice, whole must be compared with whole, and the differentiation conducted on this basis.As for the differentia being derived from the same genus as themselves, namely, Quality, and from no other genus, if we proceed on the principle that virtue is bound up with pleasure, vice with lust, virtue again with the acquisition of food, vice with idle extravagance, and accept these definitions as satisfactory, then clearly we have, here too, differentiae which are not qualities.
19.With Quality we have undertaken to group the dependent qualia, in so far as Quality is bound up with them; we shall not however introduce into this category the qualified objects [qua objects], that we may not be dealing with two categories at once; we shall pass over the objects to that which gives them their [specific] name.
But how are we to classify such terms as "not white"? If "not white" signifies some other colour, it is a quality.But if it is merely a negation of an enumeration of things not white, it will be either a meaningless sound, or else a name or definition of something actual: if a sound, it is a kind of motion; if a name or definition, it is a relative, inasmuch as names and definitions are significant.But if not only the things enumerated are in some one genus, but also the propositions and terms in question must be each of them significative of some genus, then we shall assert that negative propositions and terms posit certain things within a restricted field and deny others.Perhaps, however, it would be better, in view of their composite nature, not to include the negations in the same genus as the affirmations.
What view, then, shall we take of privations? If they are privations of qualities, they will themselves be qualities:
"toothless" and "blind," for example, are qualities."Naked" and "dothed," on the other hand, are neither of them qualities but states:
they therefore comport a relation to something else.
[With regard to passive qualities:]
Passivity, while it lasts, is not a quality but a motion; when it is a past experience remaining in one's possession, it is a quality; if one ceases to possess the experience then regarded as a finished occurrence, one is considered to have been moved- in other words, to have been in Motion.But in none of these cases is it necessary to conceive of anything but Motion; the idea of time should be excluded; even present time has no right to be introduced.
"Well" and similar adverbial expressions are to be referred to the single generic notion [of Quality].
It remains to consider whether blushing should be referred to Quality, even though the person blushing is not included in this category.The fact of becoming flushed is rightly not referred to Quality; for it involves passivity- in short, Motion.But if one has ceased to become flushed and is actually red, this is surely a case of Quality, which is independent of time.How indeed are we to define Quality but by the aspect which a substance presents? By predicating of a man redness, we clearly ascribe to him a quality.
We shall accordingly maintain that states alone, and not dispositions, constitute qualities: thus, "hot" is a quality but not "growing hot," "ill" but not "turning ill."20.We have to ascertain whether there is not to every quality a contrary.In the case of virtue and vice, even the mean appears to be contrary to the extremes.
But when we turn to colours, we do not find the intermediates so related.If we regard the intermediates as blendings of the extremes, we must not posit any contrariety other than that between black and white, but must show that all other colours are combinations of these two.Contrariety however demands that there be some one distinct quality in the intermediates, though this quality may be seen to arise from a combination.
It may further be suggested that contraries not only differ from each other, but also entail the greatest possible difference.But "the greatest possible difference" would seem to presuppose that intermediates have already been established: eliminate the series, and how will you define "the greatest possible"? Sight, we may be told, will reveal to us that grey is nearer than black to white; and taste may be our judge when we have hot, cold and no intermediate.
That we are accustomed to act upon these assumptions is obvious enough; but the following considerations may perhaps commend themselves:
White and yellow are entirely different from each other- a statement which applies to any colour whatsoever as compared with any other; they are accordingly contrary qualities.Their contrariety is independent of the presence of intermediates: between health and disease no intermediate intrudes, and yet they are contraries.
It may be urged that the products of a contrariety exhibit the greatest diversity.But "the greatest diversity" is clearly meaningless, unless we can point to lower degrees of diversity in the means.Thus, we cannot speak of "the greatest diversity" in reference to health and disease.This definition of contrariety is therefore inadmissible.
Suppose that we say "great diversity" instead of "the greatest":
if "great" is equivalent to greater and implies a less, immediate contraries will again escape us; if, on the other hand, we mean strictly "great" and assume that every quality shows a great divergence from every other, we must not suppose that the divergence can be measured by a comparative.
