It has been shown in the Critique of Pure Reason that in theoretical principles a priori, an intuitional perception a priori must be supplied in connection with any given conception; and, consequently, were it a question of a purely theoretical principle, something would have to be added to the conception of the possession of an object to make it real.But in respect of the practical principle under consideration, the procedure is just the converse of the theoretical process; so that all the conditions of perception which form the foundation of empirical possession must be abstracted or taken away in order to extend the range of the juridical conception beyond the empirical sphere, and in order to be able to apply the postulate, that every external object of the free activity of my will, so far as I have it in my power, although not in the possession of it, may be reckoned as juridically mine.
The possibility of such a possession, with consequent deduction of the conception of a nonempirical possession, is founded upon the juridical postulate of the practical reason, that "It is a juridical duty so to act towards others that what is external and useable may come into the possession or become the property of some one." And this postulate is conjoined with the exposition of the conception that what is externally one's own is founded upon a possession, that is not physical.The possibility of such a possession, thus conceived, cannot, however, be proved or comprehended in itself, because it is a rational conception for which no empirical perception can be furnished; but it follows as an immediate consequence from the postulate that has been enunciated.For, if it is necessary to act according to that juridical principle, the rational or intelligible condition of a purely juridical possession must also be possible.It need astonish no one, then, that the theoretical aspect of the principles of the external mine and thine is lost from view in the rational sphere of pure intelligence and presents no extension of knowledge; for the conception of freedom upon which they rest does not admit of any theoretical deduction of its possibility, and it can only be inferred from the practical law of reason, called the categorical imperative, viewed as a fact.
7.Application of the Principle of the Possibility of an External Mine and Thine to Objects of Experience.
The conception of a purely juridical possession is not an empirical conception dependent on conditions of space and time, and yet it has practical reality.As such it must be applicable to objects of experience, the knowledge of which is independent of the conditions of space and time.The rational process by which the conception of right is brought into relation to such objects so as to constitute a possible external mine and thine, is as follows.The conception of right, being contained merely in reason, cannot be immediately applied to objects of experience, so as to give the conception of an empirical possession, but must be applied directly to the mediating conception, in the understanding, of possession in general; so that, instead of physical holding (detentio) as an empirical representation of possession, the formal conception or thought of having, abstracted from all conditions of space and time, is conceived by the mind, and only as implying that an object is in my power and at my disposal (in potestate mea positum esse).In this relation, the term external does not signify existence in another place than where Iam, nor my resolution and acceptance at another time than the moment in which I have the offer of a thing: it signifies only an object different from or other than myself.Now the practical reason by its law of right wills, that I shall think the mine and thine in application to objects, not according to sensible conditions, but apart from these and from the possession they indicate; because they refer to determinations of the activity of the will that are in accordance with the laws of freedom.For it is only a conception of the understanding that can be brought under the rational conception of right.I may therefore say that I possess a field, although it is in quite a different place from that on which I actually find myself.For the question here is not concerning an intellectual relation to the object, but I have the thing practically in my power and at my disposal, which is a conception of possession realized by the understanding and independent of relations of space; and it is mine, because my will, in determining itself to any particular use of it, is not in conflict with the law of external freedom.Now it is just in abstraction from physical possession of the object of my free-will in the sphere of sense, that the practical reason wills that a rational possession of it shall be thought, according to intellectual conceptions which are not empirical, but contain a priori the conditions of rational possession.Hence it is in this fact, that we found the ground of the validity of such a rational conception of possession possessio noumenon) as a principle of a universally valid legislation.For such a legislation is implied and contained in the expression, "This external object is mine," because an obligation is thereby imposed upon all others in respect of it, who would otherwise not have been obliged to abstain from the use of this object.
