Such an operative ideal for an Englishman at the present time might be the vision of the State, as the collective will, securing by law a clearly conceived standard of sound efficient life for the ordinary working-class family.This present practical ideal, derived from a wider conception of the duty of the State in relation to the individual members of a civilised society, would itself be a far wider scheme than the particular proposal, that of national minimum wage, which it was invoked to assess.The statesman, enlightened by this derivative ideal, would apply it as a test and standard to the particular proposal.He would consider it, not merely 'upon its own merits' but as incorporated in the more complex organic plan of his national minimum.This organic plan and purpose would determine the 'value'
he gave to the various 'pros' and 'cons,' as for instance to the consideration how far legal intervention might weaken the private organisation of workmen in their trade-unions, so damaging other benefits of trade-unionism, or the consideration how far it was better to wait and secure a more democratically administered State before entrusting it with the delicate function of adjusting pecuniary arrangements between workmen and employers.This plan or purpose of a national minimum, as a possible desirable, will of course not remain quite stable in his mind, will not be a rigid standard.It will change somewhat in pattern, and in definiteness of outline, as some fresh outer or inner experience makes any part of it, or the whole, seem more or less desirable, or more or less possible, than formerly.
§14.But the important point to note is that it is this larger organic plan or vision, the character and changes of which are essentially qualitative, that furnishes the standard and stamps with their respective 'values' the various considerations which are said to 'determine' the practical value of the proposal and its acceptance or rejection.No social-economic proposal, however distinctively quantitative it appears, can be humanly valued in any other way.It is for this reason that a mere economist is always disabled from giving practical advice in any course of conduct.
Take two examples.Political economy can legitimately apply laws of value so as to show that, under competitive conditions, a nation must produce a larger quantity of marketable goods under a policy of free imports than under any sort of Tariff.But that proof in itself can never be sufficient ground for rejecting either a Tariff for revenue, or even a Tariff for protection.For the Statesman can never take the maximum of marketable values as his final and sufficient test.If it could be shown that national security were involved in a protective system which kept all necessary industries within the national limits, he might plead 'defence is more than opulence.' Or, if it could be shown that a protective tariff could be operated so as to distribute a slightly reduced aggregate of wealth in a manner more conducive to the popular welfare and that this consideration was not offset by fear of corruption or of impaired industrial efficiency, or other disadvantages, the Statesman might rightly adopt a Tariff in the teeth of 'economic laws.'9Or, take another example, the proposal for an eight hours day, secured by law.A purely economic enquiry might, by considering the elasticity of labour in various employments, arrive at the conclusion that a general shortening of the work-day would involve a present reduction of the product by so much percentage in different trades, and that it might involve a reduction of profits and of wages and a probable loss of so much export trade in various industries.It might even present some tentative estimates as to the effects of the pressure of this new cost of production in stimulating improved economies in mines, factories or railways.Such information would be useful and relevant, but not authoritative upon the judgment of the Statesman.For the social value of a shorter work-day would depend mainly upon the organic reactions of increased leisure upon the whole standard of life of the working family, how it affected his expenditure of his wages, its effect upon his health, education and recreations, the cultivation of family affection, the better performance of neighbourly and civic duties, and all that is involved in more liberty and a larger outlook upon life.
It is evident, in the first place, that these essential considerations lie outside the calculations of the economist, and, secondly, that the actual value set on each of them will depend upon and be derived from the whole faith and social vision of the statesman in question.
This social or human valuation of a so-called economic process or good, involves then two departures from a quantitative calculus; first, the reduction of the particular economic factors themselves from financial or other quantitative terms to vital or subjective terms; secondly, the restoration of this artificially severed economic process to the larger integrated process of human life from which it was abstracted by the scientific specialism of the economist.
The economist can find the facts, but he cannot find their human importance or value, because assigning human value means referring to an extra-economic standard.It means more than this.It means a reference to an extra-scientific standard, one whose distinctive character consists in its being the expression and operation of the organic complex of forces composing the social personality as mirrored in the conscious or unconscious efforts of the individuals and of the Society who make the valuations and frame their conduct upon them.
