'The larvae of the various Hunting Wasps demand a motionless prey who will not, by defensive movements, endanger the delicate egg and, afterwards, the tiny grub fixed to a part of the prey In addition, it is necessary that this inert prey shall be nevertheless alive; for the grub would not accept a corpse as food.Its victuals must be fresh meat and not preserved provisions.These two antagonistic conditions of immobility and life the Hymenoptera realises by means of paralysis, which destroys movement and leaves the organic principle of life intact.With a skill which our most famous vivisectors would envy, the insect drives its poison sting into the nerve centres, the seat of muscular stimulation.The operator either confines himself to a single stroke of the lancet, or else gives two, or three or more, according to the structure of the particular nervous system and the number and grouping of the nerve centres.The exact anatomy of the victim guides the needle.'10Such conduct is not made intelligible by any other hypothesis than that of a collective life of the species, the individual lives being, in fact, parts of a common specific life towards which they contribute in a manner similar to that in which the cells, with their particular lives, contribute to the life of their organism.Only by this application or extension of the 'organic metaphor' to the relations between members of an existing generation, and between successive generations, can we construct an intelligible sequence of causation between these preparatory acts of individual insects of one generation and the results accruing to other individuals of another generation.
This 'general will' (may we not call it so?), urging the individuals to the fulfilment of a purpose which is but slightly theirs, and is not mainly that of the existing generation, but which embodies the general purpose of the species or some wider purpose of a still larger organic whole, can only be realised for thought and feeling as a single current of will implying and conferring unity of life upon the species or the larger unity.
In 'lower' animal spheres we recognise this fact.But there is a tendency to hold that man, subject to some such specific urge or instincts in his primitive stages, has become more and more individualised and has done so largely by becoming more rational.The gradual displacement of instinct by reason, it is contended, has made man more self-sufficient, his life more of the nature of an end, less of a means towards the life of his tribe or nation, or even towards that of humanity as a whole.Is this so? There are two issues that open here.In the process of civilisation a man certainly becomes more individual.He differs in character more from his fellows than in earlier times; he is able to devote, and does devote, a larger share of his energies of body and mind to activities which are primarily self-regarding.Moreover, he tends to rely less exclusively or predominantly upon what would be called his instincts and more upon his reason.
§17.The 'general will,' which through forms of tribal custom and of gregarious instinct pulsed so vigorously and so insistently in tribal life, seems to have weakened with every expansion of social area and with the advancing complexity of social relations.The economy of human energy allows individuals to apply a larger share of the life-force that flows through them to what appear to them their private purposes, a smaller to the protection and development of the society or species.If we were to assign any final validity to the opposition of individual and society, this change might be regarded as a shrinkage of the dominion of the 'general will,' the specific as contrasted with the individual purpose.But though the narrow intense tribal will may thus appear to have yielded to a broader, feebler and less imperative form of national or social will, it by no means follows that this latter works less effectively for the common good.As man becomes more intelligent and more reflective, and has fortified himself with larger and more reliable records and better methods of controlling his environment, the instinctive operations of the will of groups of tribal animals give place to more conscious, more rational, purposes.
The change must not indeed be overstressed.The validity of the general will does not depend upon the degree of conscious rational purpose it has attained.It remains to-day in the most highly civilised communities what it was in primitive tribal life, an organic instinct.The rationalisation of this blind faculty of organic self-protection and advancement has not yet gone very far.Indeed, it is exceedingly important to recognise that an organic instinct of conservation and of progress underlies the wisdom of the people.Those who consider politics a rightful monopoly of the educated classes doubly err; first, in ignoring the instinctive wisdom of the people, secondly in claiming for education a higher value for political direction than it possesses.The political wisdom of the Roman or the germanic peoples partakes far more of a natural sagacity than of a reasoned process.If this applies to the great statesman, it is still more applicable to the body of the people whose consent or active cooperation contributes to the evolution of a stable and a progressive state.It is impossible to understand or to explain any long and complex movement in national history by piecing together the conscious rational designs of the individuals or groups of men who executed the several moves of which the movement seemed to consist.
