In one sort of government, therefore, the facility of action gives warrant to act, and in another the probable freedom from error.In both it is the part of the legislator to act, but to act in conformity to the laws arising from the constitution which nature bus given to man and to matter.In doing so instead of acting in opposition to nature, he fills his natural place in a system established by nature.In both, also, it is the part of the inquirer into the principles of politics, to endeavor to throw light along the path of the legislator, not vainly to attempt to persuade him, that an insuperable obstacle blocks it up.
Finally, concerning this objection, it may be observed, that it refers to casual ills connected with what is in itself an acknowledged good, and is of a character altogether different from those springing from the doctrines of the followers of Adam Smith.They hold up legislative interference as necessarily and essentially evil.
The second objection I have to note, as resulting from the nature of things themselves, is the possible evil effects of an excessive revenue accruing to the legislator, from protecting and encouraging the industry of the society and turning into his own coffers as much as possible of the amount otherwise dissipated in luxuries.A superabundant revenue in the hands of the legislator, though directly a great good, is sometimes, indirectly a great evil.It may enable him, without any expense to the society, to carry on projects that must otherwise have pressed heavily on its resources, but it also places an instrument of great power in his hands, and one which, in certain circumstances, he may turn to very pernicious ends.It may have an effect similar to that which the discovery of the western continent produced on Spain.The direct effects of the riches that flowed in from the new world, were mightily to increase the power of the Spanish monarchy.Indirectly, however, their effects were to corrupt the court and the nobles, and to spread wide, through the higher classes, a dissolute, and yet a mercenary spirit.The objection, however, only refers at all to countries where there are no public burdens to absorb the surplus public revenue.It is, consequently, totally inapplicable to Great Britain.
It also chiefly refers to countries where there are no efficient checks to abuses of the legislative or executive powers.This, too, it must be observed, is an objection which as far as I know, has n t been urged by modern political economists.
The objections, which have their foundation in the views of the subject presented by Adam Smith, and which are urged by his present followers, depend mainly on the nature of words, and the sophisms produced by a generalization from names instead of things -- from preconceived notions which verbally, but not really, embrace the phenomena.Terms, and so, also, reasonings, fitly applied to the operations of individuals in the preservation, enjoyment, and increase of wealth, are transferred immediately to societies, and the rules and principles which hold good in the one, are assumed to be exactly applicable to the other.If what is thus taken for granted be admitted, farther discussion is unnecessary, for the truth of the proposition to be proved, is implied in the terms in which it is enunciated.It has been my aim, throughout the preceding pages, to expose the fallacy of these assumptions, and, consequently, of the arguments resting on them.It is only necessary for me here, then, to state very shortly the objections, and the answers to them.
It is said capital can only augment by accumulation, and, as the interference of the legislator takes something from individual revenue, it must also take from the power to accumulate, and, consequently, instead of augmenting, must tend to diminish the sum of the capitals of all the individuals in the society, that is the national capital or stock.This objection proceeds on two assumptions, the first, that the nature of national capital, or stock, about which the whole discussion turns, which it is the object of the inquiry to investigate, and concerning which scarce two authors of note agree in opinion, is known previously to any investigation, and is precisely identical with the notion suggested by the same term applied to individual wealth.The second, that what is generally true concerning individual capital, is universally true concerning national capital, and that, as the former commonly augments by accumulation, the latter can do so in no other manner.
The answer to this objection is, that the proceedings of the legislator may increase the absolute capital and stock of the society, the provision, that is, for future wants, embodied in the stock of instruments possessed by it, though they may not increase, and may even a little diminish its relative capital, or the sum which would be brought out by measuring those instruments with one another.That it is the amount of the absolute capital of the society, which is the proper measure of the wealth of the whole, and of each individual, and that whatever augments it not only directly, and of itself advances national wealth, but ultimately, also, does so indirectly, through the stimulus given to the accumulative principle, and the addition thence arising to relative capital.
This objection and the answer to it apply to utilities.The second objection refers to the proceedings of the legislator concerning commodities wholly or in part luxuries.It proceeds on the same assumption, that what is true concerning the wealth of individuals, and sufficiently explains its increase and diminution, is also true concerning the wealth of societies, and fully explains the causes of its increase and diminution.
