These special applications raise the question:What is the interpretation of his general principle?'Self-protection'is the only justification for social interference.Where a man's conduct affects himself alone society should not 'interfere'(54)by legislation.Does this imply that we must not interfere by the pressure of public opinion?We may,as Mill replies,approve or disapprove,but so long as a man does not infringe our rights,we must leave him to the 'natural and,as it were,the spontaneous consequences of his faults.'We may dislike and even abhor anti-social 'dispositions'--cruelty and treachery --but self-regarding faults and the corresponding dispositions are not subjects of 'moral reprobation.'A man is not accountable to his fellow creatures for prudence or 'self-respect.'(55)Mill anticipates the obvious objection.No conduct is simply 'self-regarding.''No one is an entirely isolated being';and injuries to myself disqualify me for service to others.
'Self-regarding'vices,as his opponent is supposed to urge,are also socially mischievous;and we must surely be entitled to assume that the experience of the race has established some moral rules sufficiently to act upon them,however desirous we may be to allow of 'new and original experiments in living.'(56)Mill's reply is that we should punish not the fault itself but the injuries to others which result.We hang George Barnwell for murdering his uncle,whether he did it to get money for his mistress or to set up in business.We should not punish him,it is implied,for keeping a mistress;but we should punish the murder,whatever the motive.The criminal lawyer,no doubt,treats Barnwell upon this principle.But can it be morally applicable?Mill admits fully that self-regarding qualities may be rightfully praised and blamed We may think a man a fool,a lazy,useless,sensual wretch:we may,and are even bound to,tell him so frankly,avoid his society,and warn others to avoid him.My judgment of a man is not a judgment of his separate qualities but of the whole human being.I disapprove of George Barnwell himself,not simply his greediness or his vicious propensities.I think a man bad in different degrees if he is ready to murder his uncle,whether from lust or greed or even with a view to a charitable use of the plunder.The hateful thing is the character itself which,under certain conditions,leads to murder.As including prudence,it may be simply neutral or respectable;as implying vice,disgusting;and as implying cruelty,hateful.Still,I do not condemn the abstract qualities --interest in oneself,or sexual passion or even antipathy --each of which may be desirable in the right place --but the way in which they are combined in the concrete Barnwell.No quality,therefore,can be taken as simply self-regarding,for it is precisely the whole character which is the object of my moral judgment of the individual.I have spoken of the inadequate recognition of this truth by Bentham and James Mill.It makes J.
S.Mill's criterion inapplicable to the question of moral interference.lf,as he argues,we are to impress our moral standard upon others,we cannot make the distinction;for our standard implies essentially an estimate of the balance of all the man's qualities,those which primarily affect himself as much as those which primarily affect others.Here is the vital distinction between the legal and the moral question,and the characteristic defect of the external view of morality.Keeping,however,to the purely legal question,where the criterion is comparatively plain,we have other difficulties.We are only to punish Barnwell as an actual,not as a potential,murderer.We should let a man try any 'experiment in living'so long as its failure will affect himself only,or,rather,himself primarily,for no action is really 'isolated.'We are,says Mill,to put up with 'contingent'or 'constructive'injury for the sake of 'the greater good of human freedom.'(57)'Society,'he urges,cannot complain of errors for which it is responsible.It has 'absolute power'over all its members in their infancy,and could always make the next generation a little better than the last.Why,then,interfere by the coarse methods of punishment to suppress what is not directly injurious to itself?The strongest,however,of all reasons against interference,according to him,is that it generally interferes wrongly and in the wrong place.In proof of this he refers to various cases of religious persecution:to Puritanical laws against harmless recreation:to Socialist laws against the freedom to labour:to laws against intemperance and on behalf of Sunday observance:and,generally,to laws embodying the 'tyranny of the majority.'We may admit the badness of such legislation;but what is the criterion by which we are to decide its badness or goodness?Is it that in such cases the legislator is usurping the province of the moralist?that he is trying to suppress symptoms when the causes are beyond his power,and enforcing not virtue but hypocrisy?Or is it that he really ought to be indifferent in regard to the moral rules which are primarily self-regarding --to leave prudence,for example,to take care of itself or to be impressed by purely natural penalties;and to be indifferent to vice,drunkenness,or sexual irregularities,except by suppressing the crimes which incidentally result?Mill endeavours to adhere to his criterion,but has some difficulty in reconciling it to his practical conclusions.
