Freethinking flourishes where there was once abject superstition,and therefore the country cannot by itself explain the superstition.When,for example,Buckle explains the artistic temperament of Greeks or Italians by the physical characteristics,he is no doubt assigning a real cause,but obviously a cause insufficient to explain the singular changes,the efflorescence and the decay of artistic production in either country.One result is characteristic.The differences are often explained by 'heredity'or the inheritance by races of qualities not developed by their present environment,and essentially dependent upon the previous social evolution.Buckle fully admits that the question of 'heredity'is not settled by scientific inquiry.(36)He infers,and I suppose rightly,that we cannot assume that there is any organic difference between an infant born in the most civilised country and one born in the most barbarous region.Still,he 'cordially subscribes'to Mill's protest against explaining differences of character by race.(37)So far as this excludes all the influences by which a society is moulded through inherited beliefs and customs,it sanctions an erroneous inference.Because race differences are not ultimate,or indicative of absolute organic distinctions,they are altogether cast out of account.The existing differences have to be attributed entirely to the physical surroundings;and the influence of 'aspects of nature'is summarily adduced to explain much that is really explicable only through the history of the organism itself.(38)How far this may have led Buckle to exaggerate the direct efficacy of mere physical surroundings I cannot further inquire.
At any rate,his whole purpose is to explain the growth of civilisation,which must,as he perceives,be done by introducing a variable element.Here,therefore,we have to consider the state in which the 'mental'become more influential than the physical laws.Buckle begins by expounding a doctrine of critical importance.In general terms,he holds that progress depends upon the intellectual factor.A similar doctrine had been emphatically asserted by Comte,and was,indeed,implied as a fundamental conception in his whole work.Ideas,he says,govern the world:
'Tout lemanisme social repose sur les opinions.'(39)The law of the 'three stages'is a systematic application of this doctrine.The doctrine,again,recognises an undeniable truth.
Man is dependent throughout upon his environment.That,in a sense,remains constant.The savage lives in the same world as the civilised man.But every step of knowledge implies a change in the man's relations to the world.His position is determined not simply by the 'physical laws,'but by his knowledge of the laws.The discovery of iron or of electricity makes his world,if not the world,different;and the whole system of knowledge corresponds to an ultimate condition of his life.His knowledge,therefore,is an essential factor in the problem.The rationalism of the eighteenth century and the later progress of science had of course emphasised this truth.The natural sciences represent the intellectual framework,which steadily grows and at every stage gives a final determinant of all human activity.
Superstitions and theology in general correspond to the erroneous theories which are gradually dispelled as we construct a definitive and verifiable base of solid knowledge.But is the scientific progress not only the ultimate but the sole factor in all social development?Man is a complex being,with an emotional as well as an intellectual nature,which,proximately at any rate,determines his conduct.How are we to allow for this factor of the inquiry?(40)Buckle's version of the principle is significant.He begins by distinguishing 'progress'into 'moral'and 'intellectual.'(41)Which of these is the important element?Do men progress in the moral or in the intellectual element?Since,as we have seen,we cannot assume an improvement in the individual,the later differences must be ascribed to the 'external advantages'--to the opinions and so forth of the society in which the child is educated.In the next place,the opinions are constantly varying,whereas the 'moral motives'are singularly constant.(42)A 'stationary element,'when surrounding circumstances are unchanged,can only produce a stationary effect,and hence we must explain civilisation by the variable agent.Buckle argues that the moral code recognised has remained unaltered since distant times.The same general rules are accepted,and no additional articles have been inserted.Then the great stages of progress especially the growth of religious toleration and of peace --have been due to intellectual,not to moral changes;and,finally,as he thinks,the average man remains pretty much the same.Some men are good and some bad;but the good and the bad actions neutralise each other.Their effects are temporary,while the 'discoveries of great men'are 'immortal,'and contain the 'eternal truths which survive the shock of empires,outlive the struggles of rival creeds,and witness the decay of successive religions.'(43)Buckle,that is,reserves for the 'eternal truths'of scientific discovery the enthusiasm which others had lavished upon the eternal truths of the great religious teachers.The doctrine agrees with the Utilitarian theories in one respect.Man is supposed to remain On the whole constant,in his natural capacities and in his moral qualities.On the other hand,Buckle dwells more emphatically than Mill upon the spontaneous growth of scientific ideas as the sole but sufficient force which moulds the destinies of mankind.
