73.Logic,p.500(bk.v.ch.iii section 7).It may be noted that Whewell (in 1847)equally regards Bacon's theory as a complete failure.He thinks more favourably of an 'imponderable fluid.'Mill,therefore,had good authority as to the failure.
The modern doctrine,says Lord Kelvin (Encycl.Britannica),was established about 1851.See Huxley on the 'Progress of Science'
(Essays,i.86)for Whewell's treatment of Bacon's guess.
74.Logic,p.226(bk.iii.ch.v.section 7).
75.Logic,p.306(bk.iii.ch.xii.section 2).See Chalmer's Natural Theology,bk.ii.ch.i.
76.Logic,pp.377-85(bk.iii.ch.xxii).
77.Logic,pp.79-81(bk.i.ch.vii.section 4).
78.Logic,pp.377-86(bk.iii.ch.xxii).
79.It has been suggested that upon Mill's principles the change of a lobster's colour to red is 'caused'when he is boiled,but the colour before boiling uncaused.A case in the South Kensington Museum showing variously coloured crows is a tacit comment on Mill's illustration.The colour of crows is obviously considered by modern men of science as implying causal relations.
80.Logic,p.382(bk.iii.ch.xxii.section 6).
81.Ibid.p.381(bk.iii.ch.xxii.section 4).
82.Logic,p.470(bk.iv.ch.vii.section 4).It is curious that this remains in the last edition,that is,after the first Darwinian controversies.
83.See Sigwart's Logik (1889),ii.456,etc.
84.Logic,pp.370-76(bk.iii.ch.xx.section 1,4).
85.Ibid.p.372(bk.iii.ch.xxi.section 2).
86.Ibid.p.373(bk.iii.ch.xxi.section 3).
87.Logic,p.382(bk.iii.ch.xxii.section 5).
88.Ibid.p.384(bk.iii.ch.xxii.section 8).
89.As he says in the Examination of Hamilton,ch.xix.
90.Logic.p.142(bk.ii.ch.iv.section 4).
91.Some writers,especially G.H.Lewes,have tried to maintain that the statement of the uniformity of Nature is an 'identical proposition.'The attempt is unsatisfactory,and certainly does not seem to have found favour with later writers;but,though Iam unable to discuss the question,I will suggest that it seems to indicate the ideal result of reasoning.We assume that,if our knowledge were complete,we could state all the laws of action and reaction of any element as necessary consequences of its primitive constitution,as we can deduce all the properties of number and space from primary principles.Though we can never attain such a consummation,we can reject any theory which contradicts it,and,therefore,such doctrines as the 'plurality of causes,'which come to supposing that an identical process may be analysed in two inconsistent ways.
92.E.g.by Mr F.H.Bradley in his Principles of Logic (1883),pp.329-42.Dr Venn,who is much more favourable to Mill,discusses them in his Empirical or Inductive Logic (1889),pp.
400-31,shows very clearly how they assume what he calls the 'popular',as distinguished from the 'rigidly scientific',view of causation.Elsewhere (p.58)he remarks that the popular might be called the 'Brown-Herschel-Mill view,'as those writers popularised the doctrine first clearly set forth by Hume.See also Sigwart's Logik (1889),ii.469-500.
