Ath.But then if we admit suffering to be just and yet dishonourable,and the term "dishonourable"is applied to justice,will not the just and the honourable disagree?
Cle.What do you mean?
Ath.A thing not difficult to understand;the laws which have been already enacted would seem to announce principles directly opposed to what we are saying.
Cle.To what?
Ath.We had enacted,if I am not mistaken,that the robber of temples,and he who was the enemy of law and order,might justly be put to death,and we were proceeding to make divers other enactments of a similar nature.But we stopped short,because we saw that these sufferings are infinite in number and degree,and that they are,at once,the most just and also the most dishonourable of all sufferings.
And if this be true,are not the just and the honourable at one time all the same,and at another time in the most diametrical opposition?
Cle.Such appears to be the case.
Ath.In this discordant and inconsistent fashion does the language of the many rend asunder the honourable and just.
Cle.Very true,Stranger.
Ath.Then now,Cleinias,let us see how far we ourselves are consistent about these matters.
Cle.Consistent in what?
Ath.I think that I have clearly stated in the former part of the discussion,but if I did not,let me now state-Cle.What?
Ath.That all bad men are always involuntarily bad;and from this must proceed to draw a further inference.
Cle.What is it?
Ath.That the unjust man may be bad,but that he is bad against his will.Now that an action which is voluntary should be done involuntarily is a contradiction;wherefore he who maintains that injustice is involuntary will deem that the unjust does injustice involuntarily.I too admit that all men do injustice involuntarily,and if any contentious or disputatious person says that men are unjust against their will,and yet that many do injustice willingly,I do not agree with him.But,then,how can I avoid being inconsistent with myself,if you,Cleinias,and you,Megillus,say to me-Well,Stranger,if all this be as you say,how about legislating for the city of the Magnetes-shall we legislate or not-what do you advise?Certainly we will,I should reply.Then will you determine for them what are voluntary and what are involuntary crimes,and shall we make the punishments greater of voluntary errors and crimes and less for the involuntary?or shall we make the punishment of all to be alike,under the idea that there is no such thing as voluntary crime?
Cle.Very good,Stranger;and what shall we say in answer to these objections?
Ath.That is a very fair question.In the first place,let us-Cle.Do what?
Ath.Let us remember what has been well said by us already,that our ideas of justice are in the highest degree confused and contradictory.
Bearing this in mind,let us proceed to ask ourselves once more whether we have discovered a way out of the difficulty.Have we ever determined in what respect these two classes of actions differ from one another?For in all states and by all legislators whatsoever,two kinds of actions have been distinguished-the one,voluntary,the other,involuntary;and they have legislated about them accordingly.
But shall this new word of ours,like an oracle of God,be only spoken,and get away without giving any explanation or verification of itself?How can a word not understood be the basis of legislation?
Impossible.Before proceeding to legislate,then,we must prove that they are two,and what is the difference between them,that when we impose the penalty upon either,every one may understand our proposal,and be able in some way to judge whether the penalty is fitly or unfitly inflicted.
Cle.I agree with you,Stranger;for one of two things is certain:
either we must not say that all unjust acts are involuntary,or we must show the meaning and truth of this statement.
Ath.Of these two alternatives,the one is quite intolerable-not to speak what I believe to be the truth would be to me unlawful and unholy.But if acts of injustice cannot be divided into voluntary and involuntary,I must endeavour to find some other distinction between them.
Cle.Very true,Stranger;there cannot be two opinions among us upon that point.
Ath.Reflect,then;there are hurts of various kinds done by the citizens to one another in the intercourse of life,affording plentiful examples both of the voluntary and involuntary.
Cle.Certainly.
Ath.I would not have any one suppose that all these hurts are injuries,and that these injuries are of two kinds-one,voluntary,and the other,involuntary;for the involuntary hurts of all men are quite as many and as great as the voluntary?And please to consider whether I am right or quite wrong in what I am going to say;for Ideny,Cleinias and Megillus,that he who harms another involuntarily does him an injury involuntarily,nor should I legislate about such an act under the idea that I am legislating for an involuntary injury.
But I should rather say that such a hurt,whether great or small,is not an injury at all;and,on the other hand,if I am right,when a benefit is wrongly conferred,the author of the benefit may often be said to injure.For I maintain,O my friends,that the mere giving or taking away of anything is not to be described either as just or unjust;but the legislator has to consider whether mankind do good or harm to one another out of a just principle and intention.On the distinction between injustice and hurt he must fix his eye;and when there is hurt,he must,as far as he can,make the hurt good by law,and save that which is ruined,and raise up that which is fallen,and make that which is dead or wounded whole.And when compensation has been given for injustice,the law must always seek to win over the doers and sufferers of the several hurts from feelings of enmity to those of friendship.
Cle.Very good.
