I am satisfied that the authorities at Washington do not appreciate the difficulties with which we have to contend here. The operations of Lane, Jennison, and others have so enraged the people of Missouri that it is estimated that there is a majority of 8o,ooo against the government. We are virtually in an enemy's country. Price and others have a considerable army in the southwest, against which I am operating with all my available force.
This city and most of the middle and northern counties are insurrectionary,--burning bridges, destroying telegraph lines, etc.,--and can be kept down only by the presence of troops. A large portion of the foreign troops organized by General Fremont are unreliable; indeed, many of them are already mutinous. They have been tampered with by politicians, and made to believe that if they get up a mutiny and demand Fremont's return the government will be forced to restore him to duty here. It is believed that some high officers are in the plot I have already been obliged to disarm several of these organizations, and I am daily expecting more serious outbreaks. Another grave difficulty is the want of proper general officers to command the troops and enforce order and discipline, and especially to protect public property from robbery and plunder. Some of the brigadier-generals assigned to this department are entirely ignorant of their duties and unfit for any command. I assure you, Mr. President, it is very difficult to accomplish much with such means. I am in the condition of a carpenter who is required to build a bridge with a dull axe, a broken saw, and rotten timber. It is true that I have some very good green timber, which will answer the purpose as soon as I can get it into shape and season it a little.
I know nothing of General Buell's intended operations, never having received any information in regard to the general plan of campaign.
If it be intended that his column shall move on Bowling Green while another moves from Cairo or Paducah on Columbus or Camp Beauregard, it will be a repetition of the same strategic error which produced the disaster of Bull Run. To operate on exterior lines against an enemy occupying a central position will fail, as it always has failed, in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred. It is condemned by every military authority I have ever read.
General Buell's army and the forces at Paducah occupy precisely the same position in relation to each other and to the enemy as did the armies of McDowell and Patterson before the battle of Bull Run.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, H. W. HALLECK, Major-General [Indorsement]
The within is a copy of a letter just received from General Halleck.
It is exceedingly discouraging. As everywhere else, nothing can be done.
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GOVERNOR ANDREW.
WASHINGTON, D. C., January 11, 1862
GOVERNOR JOHN A. ANDREW, Boston:
I will be greatly obliged if you will arrange; somehow with General Butler to officer his two un-officered regiments.
A. LINCOLN
TO GENERAL D. C. BUELL.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, January 13, 1861
BRIGADIER-GENERAL BUELL.
MY DEAR SIR -Your despatch of yesterday is received, in which you say, "I received your letter and General McClellan's, and will at once devote my efforts to your views and his." In the midst of my many cares I have not seen, nor asked to see, General McClellan's letter to you. For my own views, I have not offered and do not now offer them as orders; and while I am glad to have them respectfully considered, I would blame you to follow them contrary to your own clear judgment, unless I should put them in the form of orders. As to General McClellan's views, you understand your duty in regard to them better than I do.
With this preliminary I state my general idea of this war to be, that we have the greater numbers and the enemy has the greater facility of concentrating forces upon points of collision; that we must fail unless we can find some way of making our advantage an overmatch for his; and that this can only be done by menacing him with superior forces at different points at the same time, so that we can safely attack one or both if he makes no change; and if he weakens one to strengthen the other, forbear to attack the strengthened one, but seize and hold the weakened one, gaining so much.
To illustrate: Suppose last summer, when Winchester ran away to reinforce Manassas, we had forborne to attack Manassas, but had seized and held Winchester. I mention this to illustrate and not to criticise. I did not lose confidence in McDowell, and I think less harshly of Patterson than some others seem to. . . . Applying the principle to your case, my idea is that Halleck shall menace Columbus and "down river" generally, while you menace Bowling Green and East Tennessee. If the enemy shall concentrate at Bowling Green, do not retire from his front, yet do not fight him there either, but seize Columbus and East Tennessee, one or both, left exposed by the concentration at Bowling Green. It is a matter of no small anxiety to me, and which I am sure you will not overlook, that the East Tennessee line is so long and over so bad a road.
Yours very truly, A. LINCOLN.
(Indorsement.)
Having to-day written General Buell a letter, it occurs to me to send General Halleck a copy of it.
A. LINCOLN.
TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, January 1 , 1862.
MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK.
MY DEAR SIR:--The Germans are true and patriotic and so far as they have got cross in Missouri it is upon mistake and misunderstanding.
