But these mere technical rules,upon which we have hitherto considered the subject,are altogether unworthy of its importance,and far beneath its dignity.Sovereign nations do not ask their judges what are their rights,nor do they limit their powers by judicial precedents.Still less do they entrust these important subjects to judicial tribunals not their own,and least of all,to the tribunals of that power against which their own power is asserted.It would have been a gross inconsistency in the States of our Union to do this,since they have shown in every part of their compact with one another,the most jealous care of their separate sovereignty and independence.It is true they have agreed to be bound by the decisions of federal tribunals in certain specified cases,and it is not to be doubted that,so long as they desire the continuance of their present union,they will feel themselves bound,in every case which comes plainly within their agreement.There is no necessity to call in the aid of the Supreme Court to ascertain to what subjects,and how far that agreement extends.So far as it is plain,it will be strictly observed,as national faith and honor require;there is no other guarantee.So far as it is not plain,or so far as it may be the will and pleasure of any State to deny or to resist it,the utter impotency of courts of justice to settle the difficulty will be manifested beyond all doubt.They will be admonished of their responsibility to the power which created them.The States created them.They are but an emanation of the sovereign power of the States,and can neither limit nor control that power.
Ordinarily,the judiciary are the proper interpreters of the powers of government,but they interpret in subordination to the power which created them.In governments established by an aggregate people,such as are those of the States,a proper corrective is always found in the people themselves.
If the judicial interpretation confer too much or too little power on the government,a ready remedy is found in an amendment of the Constitution.
But in our federal system the evil is without remedy,if the federal courts be allowed to fix the limits of federal power with reference to those of the States.It would place every thing in the State governments,except their mere existence,at the mercy of a single department of the Federal Government.The maxim,stare decisis,is not always adhered to by our courts;
their own decisions are not held to be absolutely binding upon themselves.
They may establish a right today and unsettle it tomorrow.A decision of the Supreme Court might arrest a State in the full exercise of an important and necessary power,which a previous decision of the same court had ascertained that she possessed.Thus the powers of the State governments,as to many important objects,might be kept indeterminate and constantly liable to change,so that they would lose their efficiency,and forfeit all title to confidence and respect.It is true,that in this case,too,there is a possible corrective in the power to amend the Constitution.But that power is not with the aggrieved State alone;it could be exerted only in connection with other States,whose aid she might not be able to command.
And even if she could command it,the process would be too slow to afford effectual relief.It is impossible to imagine that any free and sovereign State ever designed to surrender her power of self protection in a case like this,or ever meant to authorize any other power to reduce her to a situation so helpless and contemptible.25
Yielding,therefore,to the Supreme Court all the jurisdiction and authority which properly belongs to it,we cannot safely or wisely repose in it the vast trust of ascertaining,defining or limiting the sovereign powers of the States.
