About six months agowhen an Association which has been formed for thecodification of the Law of Nations (which I may describe parentheticallyas most excellent undertakingwas holding its meetingsthe subject attractedconsiderablethough only momentaryattentionAn eminent French economist,Mde Molinaripublished a proposal for what he called a League of NeutralPowersThe majority of civilised states are always neutralthough the neutralsare not always the sameIf the neutrals combine they are irresistiblepartlyfrom their strength and partly from their power to make one of two belligerentPowers irresistible by joining its sideMde Molinari's suggestion wasthat it should be one of the duties of neutrality to thwart the spirit ofbelligerencyto make it a rule that the outbreak of hostility between anytwo Powers should be a casus belli as regards the restand to embody thesearrangements in the stipulations of a treatyIt is impossible to deny thatif such a combination of neutral Powers could be effected under the suggestedconditions it would be a most effectual safeguard against warand this isin itself an ample justification for starting the proposalBut the objectionsto it are plainand were at once advancedIf carried into effectit mightdiminish the chances of warbut it takes for granted that the mechanismof war will remain unimpairedIf neutrals are to be equal to their new duties,they must maintain great armies and navies on the modern scaleor they maynot be able to cope with the contemplated emergencyThusthough the riskof war might be lessenedthe burden of war would at best remain the same;there would be the same vast unproductive expenditurethe same ruinous displacementof industry One result of the scheme mightin factdefeat anotherIt isnot altogether true in civil affairs that the strong man armed keeps hishouse in peaceThe fact that he wears full armour is sometimes a sourceof quarrelsomenessand a temptation to attack his neighbours.
The scheme of Hde Molinari failed to command the attention and interestwhich were essential to its serious considerationbecause it was too largeand ambitiousIt was nevertheless foundedas it appears to meon a correctprinciplethatif war is ever to be arrestedit will be arrested by sacrificeson the part of those states which are neither at war nor desire to go towarThere is a very ancient example of this method of arresting and preventingthe spread of warJust before the dawn of Greek historyeve have a glimpseof the existence of several combinations of Greek tribes (which as yet canscarcely be called statesfor the purpose of preventing war among themselvesand resisting attacks from outsideOf these 'amphiktiones,alliances ofneighbouring communities clustered round a temple as a sanctuaryone onlyconstituted on a respectable scale survived to historical timeevidentlyin a state of decayand liable to become the tool of any aggressive militaryPowerbut still even then greatly veneratedNow let us look around theworld of our dayand try to see whether we can find anywhere an exampleof a successful amphiktionya combination of neighbouring Powers formedfor the purpose of preventing wars.
