Soc. Why, my friend, the inference is that the good is not the same as the pleasant, or the evil the same as the painful; there is a cessation of pleasure and pain at the same moment; but not of good and evil, for they are different. How then can pleasure be the same as good, or pain as evil? And I would have you look at the matter in another light, which could hardly, I think, have been considered by you identified them: Are not the good they have good present with them, as the beautiful are those who have beauty present with them?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. And do you call the fools and cowards good men? For you were saying just now that the courageous and the wise are the good would you not say so?
Cal. Certainly.
Soc. And did you never see a foolish child rejoicing?
Cal. Yes, I have.
Soc. And a foolish man too?
Cal. Yes, certainly; but what is your drift?
Soc. Nothing particular, if you will only answer.
Cal. Yes, I have.
Soc. And did you ever see a sensible man rejoicing or sorrowing?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. Which rejoice and sorrow most-the wise or the foolish?
Cal. They are much upon a par, I think, in that respect.
Soc. Enough: And did you ever see a coward in battle?
Cal. To be sure.
Soc. And which rejoiced most at the departure of the enemy, the coward or the brave?
Cal. I should say "most" of both; or at any rate, they rejoiced about equally.
Soc. No matter; then the cowards, and not only the brave, rejoice?
Cal. Greatly.
Soc. And the foolish; so it would seem?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. And are only the cowards pained at the approach of their enemies, or are the brave also pained?
Cal. Both are pained.
Soc. And are they equally pained?
Cal. I should imagine that the cowards are more pained.
Soc. And are they better pleased at the enemy's departure?
Cal. I dare say.
Soc. Then are the foolish and the wise and the cowards and the brave all pleased and pained, as you were saying, in nearly equal degree;but are the cowards more pleased and pained than the brave?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. But surely the wise and brave are the good, and the foolish and the cowardly are the bad?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. Then the good and the bad are pleased and pained in a nearly equal degree?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. Then are the good and bad good and bad in a nearly equal degree, or have the bad the advantage both in good and evil? [i.e.
in having more pleasure and more pain.]
Cal I really do not know what you mean.
Soc. Why, do you not remember saying that the good were good because good was present with them, and the evil because evil; and that pleasures were goods and pains evils?
Cal. Yes, I remember.
Soc. And are not these pleasures or goods present to those who rejoice-if they do rejoice?
Cal. Certainly.
Soc. Then those who rejoice are good when goods are present with them?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. And those who are in pain have evil or sorrow present with them?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. And would you still say that the evil are evil by reason of the presence of evil?
Cal. I should.
Soc. Then those who rejoice are good, and those who are in pain evil?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. The degrees of good and evil vary with the degrees of pleasure and of pain?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. Have the wise man and the fool, the brave and the coward, joy and pain in nearly equal degrees? or would you say that the coward has more?
Cal. I should say that he has.
Soc. Help me then to draw out the conclusion which follows from our admissions; for it is good to repeat and review what is good twice and thrice over, as they say. Both the wise man and the brave man we allow to be good?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. And the foolish man and the coward to be evil?
Cal. Certainly.
Soc. And he who has joy is good?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. And he who is in pain is evil?
Cal. Certainly.
Soc. The good and evil both have joy and pain, but, perhaps, the evil has more of them?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. Then must we not infer, that the bad man is as good and bad as the good, or, perhaps, even better?-is not this a further inference which follows equally with the preceding from the assertion that the good and the pleasant are the same:-can this be denied, Callicles?
Cal. I have been listening and making admissions to you, Socrates;and I remark that if a person grants you anything in play, you, like a child, want to keep hold and will not give it back. But do you really suppose that I or any other human being denies that some pleasures are good and others bad?
Soc. Alas, Callicles, how unfair you are! you certainly treat me as if I were a child, sometimes saying one thing, and then another, as if you were meaning to deceive me. And yet I thought at first that you were my friend, and would not have deceived me if you could have helped. But I see that I was mistaken; and now I suppose that I must make the best of a bad business, as they said of old, and take what I can get out of you.-Well, then, as I understand you to say, I may assume that some pleasures are good and others evil?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. The beneficial are good, and the hurtful are evil?
Cal. To be sure.
Soc. And the beneficial are those which do some good, and the hurtful are those which do some evil?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. Take, for example, the bodily pleasures of eating and drinking, which were just now mentioning-you mean to say that those which promote health, or any other bodily excellence, are good, and their opposites evil?
Cal. Certainly.
Soc. And in the same way there are good pains and there are evil pains?
Cal. To be sure.
Soc. And ought we not to choose and use the good pleasures and pains?
Cal. Certainly.
Soc. But not the evil?
Cal. Clearly.
Soc. Because, if you remember, Polus and I have agreed that all our actions are to be done for the sake of the good-and will you agree with us in saying, that the good is the end of all our actions, and that all our actions are to be done for the sake of the good, and not the good, for of them?-will you add a third vote to our two?
Cal. I will.
Soc. Then pleasure, like everything else, is to be sought for the sake of that which is good, and not that which is good for the sake of pleasure?
Cal. To be sure.
Soc. But can every man choose what pleasures are good and what are evil, or must he have art or knowledge of them in detail?
Cal. He must have art.
