Self-consciousness is born from this ocean， dripping with the water thereof， i.e.， never coming to absolute self-hood； the heart， the independence is transfixed - the vital fire is wanting. This lack has to be supplied， the moment of self-consciousness has to be added. It has the following two special aspects， which we now perceive emerging and gaining acceptance； in the first place the objective aspect， that absolute essence obtains in self-consciousness the mode of an object of consciousness for which the “other” exists， or the existent as such， and that what Spinoza， understood by the “modes” is elevated to objective reality its an absolute moment of the absolute；in the second place we have the aspect of self-consciousness， individuality， independence. As was formerly the case with respect to Bacon and Boehme， the former aspect is here taken up by the Englishman， John Locke， the latter by the German Leibnitz； in the first case it did not appear as a moment， nor did it in the second appear as absolute Notion. Now while Spinoza only takes notice of these ordinary conceptions， and. the highest point of view he reaches in regard to them is that they sink and disappear in the one Substance， Locke on the contrary examines the genesis of these conceptions， while Leibnitz opposes to Spinoza the infinite multiplicity of individuals， although all these monads have one monad as the basis of their Being. Both Locke and Leibnitz therefore came forward as opponents of the abovementioned one-sidedness of Spinoza.
1. Collectanea de vita B. de Spinoza (addita Operibus ed. Paulus Jenn？ 1802-1803， T. II.)， pp.
593-604， 612-628 (Spinoza Epist. LIII-LIV. in Oper. ed. Paul T. I. pp. 638-640) 642-665；Spinoz？ Oper. ed. Paul T. II. Pr？f. p. XVI.
2. Collectanea de vita B. de Spinoza， pp. 629-641； Spinoz？ Ethic. (Oper. T. II.) Pp. 1， 3 et not.， 33.
3. Spinoz. Ethices， P. I. Prop. V. VIII. X. et Schol.， XIII. pp. 37-39， 41， 42， 45.
4. Spinoz. Ethices， P. I. Prop. XVII.， Coroll. I.， II.， et Schol.， Prop. XVIII.， Prop. XX.， et Coroll.
I. Prop. XXI.， XXVI.， XXVII.， XXIX.， XXXII.， XXXIII. Schol. II. pp. 51-57， 59， 61， 63， 67， 68.
5. Spinoz. Ethices， P. II. Prop. I.， II.， VII. et Schol. pp. 78， 79， 82， 83.
6. Spinoz. Ethic. P. I. Prop. XXX-XXXII. pp. 62， 63； P. III. Defin. III. p. 132； Prop. XI. Schol.， p. 141.
7. Spinoz. Ethices， P. II. Prop. XI. Demonst. et Coroll. pp. 86， 87； Defin. IV. pp. 77， 78.
8. Dictionnaire historique et critique (édition de 1740， T. IV.)， Article Spinosa， p. 261， Note N.
No. IV.
9. Spinoz. Ethices， P. II. Prop. XII.， XIII. et Schol. Prop. XIV.， XXIII.， V. pp. 87-89， 95， 102， 80， 81.
10. Spinoz. Ethices， P. II. Prop. XI. (Axiom I. p. 78) et Demonstr. Prop. X. pp. 85-87； Prop.
VI. p. 81； P. III. Prop. II. pp. 133， 134.
11. Spinoz. Ethices， P. III. Prop. VI-VIII. Prop. IX. Schol. pp. 139，1 140； P. II. Prop. XLIX.
Coroll. p. 123； P. III. Prop. II. Schol. p. 136； P. V. Prop. III. Demonst. et Coroll. pp. 272， 273.
12. Spinoz. Ethices， P. III. Prop. I. p. 132； Prop. III. p. 138； P. IV. Pr？f. p. 199； P. III. Prop.
XI. Schol. pp. 141， 142； P. IV. Prop. II. p. 205； P. III. Prop. III. et Schol. p. 138.
13. Spinoz. Ethices， P. V. Prop. XXXVI. Schol. Prop. XXXVIL Demonstr.， Prop. XXXVIII. et Schol. pp. 293-295.
14. Spinoz. Ethices， P. II. Prop. XL. Schol. II. pp. 113， 114.
15. Spinoz. Ethices， P. II. Prop. XLIV. et Coroll. II. pp. 117， 118； Prop. XLV. p. 119； P. V.
Prop. XXX. p. 289： P. II. Prop. XXXII. p. 107.
16. Spinoz. Ethices， P. V. Prop. XIV. p. 280； Prop. VI. p. 275； Prop. XXVII. pp. 287， 288；Prop. XXXII. Coroll.； Prop. XXXV. pp. 291， 292.
Section Two： Period of the Thinking Understanding Chapter I. - The Metaphysics of the Understanding A 3. MALEBRANCHEThe philosophy of Malebranche is in point of matter entirely identical with that of Spinoza， but it has another， a more religious and more theological form； on account of this form it never encountered the opposition met with by Spinoza， and for the same reason Malebranche has never been reproached with Atheism.
Nicholas Malebranche was born at Paris in 1638. He was sickly and deformed in body， and was hence brought up with great care. He was diffident and loved solitude； in his twenty-second year he entered the congrégation de l’ oratoire， a sort of spiritual order， and devoted himself to the sciences. In passing a bookseller’ s shop he happened accidentally to see Descartes’ work De homine； he read it，and it interested him greatly - so much so that the reading of it brought on severe palpitation and he was forced to cease. This decided his future life； there awoke in him an irrepressible inclination for Philosophy. He was a man of most noble and gentle character， and of the most genuine， and unswerving， piety. He died at Paris in 1715， and in， the seventy-seventh year of his age.(1)His principal work bears the title： De la recherche de la vérité. One part of it is entirely metaphysical， but the greater part is altogether empirical. For instance， Malebranche in the first three books treats logically and psychologically of the errors in sight and hearing， in the imagination and understanding.
