Unlesse you give Children all they aske for,they are peevish,and cry,I and strike their parents sometimes,and all this they have from nature,yet are they free from guilt,neither may we properly call them wicked;first,because they cannot hurt;next,because wanting the free use of reason they are exempted from all duty;these when they come to riper yeares having acquired power whereby they may doe hurt,if they shall continue to doe the same things,then truly they both begin to be,and are properly accounted wicked;In so much as a wicked man is almost the same thing with a childe growne strong and sturdy,or a man of a childish disposition;and malice the same with a defect of reason in that age,when nature ought to be better governed through good education and experience.Unlesse therefore we will say that men are naturally evill,because they receive not their education and use of reason from nature,we must needs acknowledge that men may derive desire,feare,anger,and other passions from nature,and yet not impute the evill effects of those unto nature.
The foundation therefore which I have laid standing firme,Idemonstrate in the first place,that the state of men without civill society (which state we may properly call the state of nature)is nothing else but a meere warre of all against all;and in that warre all men have equall right unto all things;Next,that all men as soone as they arrive to understanding of this hatefull condition,doe desire (even nature it selfe compelling them)to be freed from this misery.But that this cannot be done except by compact,they all quitt that right which they have unto all things.Furthermore I declare,and confirme what the nature of compacts is;how and by what meanes the right of one might be transfer'd unto another to make their compacts valid;also what rights,and to whom they must necessarily be granted for the establishing of peace,I meane what those dictates of reason are,which may properly be term'd the Lawes of nature;and all these are contain'd in that part of this booke which I entitle Liberty.
These grounds thus layd,I shew farther what civill government,and the supreme power in it,and the divers kinds of it are;by what meanes it becomes so,&what rights particular men,who intend to constitute this civill government,must so necessarily transfer from themselves on the supreme power,whether it be one man,or an assembly of men,that except they doe so it will evidently appeare to be no civill government,but the rights which all men have to all things,that is the rights of tarre will still remaine.Next,I distinguish the divers kindes of it,to wit,Monarchie,Aristocratie,Democratie,and paternall Dominion,and that of Masters over their Servants;Ideclare how they are constituted,and I compare their severall conveniences and inconveniences each with.other.furthermore,Iunfold what those things are which destroy it,and what his or their duty is who rule in chiefe.Last of all,I explicate the natures of the Law,and of sinne,and I distinguish Law from Counsell,from compact,from that which I call Right;all which Icomprehend under the title of Dominion.
In the last part of it which is entituled Religion,lest that right which by strong reason I had confirm'd the Soveraigne powers in the preceding discourse have over their Subjects,might seem to be repugnant to the sacred Scriptures,I shew in the first place how it repugns not the Divine right,for as much as God overrules all rulers by nature,(i.e.)by the Dictates of naturall reason.In the second,for as much as God himselfe had a peculiar dominion over the Jewes by vertue of that antient Covenant of Circumcision.In the third,because God doth now rule over us Christians by vertue of our Covenant of Baptisme;and therefore the authority of Rulers in chiefe,or of civill government,is not at all,we see,contrary to Religion.
In the last place I declare what duties are necessarily requir'd from us,to enter into the Kingdome of Heaven;and of those I plainly demonstrate,and conclude out of evident testimonies of holy writ,according to the interpretation made by all,that the obedience which I have affirm'd to be due from particular Christian Subjects unto their Christian princes cannot possibly in the least sort be repugnant unto Christian Religion.
