At nine o'clock on the evening of the 30th, the corps commanders met at Rosecrans's headquarters, in the cedars near the Murfreesboro pike, to receive their final instructions and to learn the details of the plan of battle for the next day.McCook was directed with his three divisions to occupy the most advantageous position, refusing his right as much as practicable and necessary to secure it, to await the attack of the enemy, and in the event of that not being made, to himself engage and hold the force on his front, Johnson's division held the extreme right of his line; on Johnson's left was Davis's division, and on Davis's left Sheridan's was posted.Thomas was instructed to open with skirmishing and engage the enemy's centre with Negley's division of his command and Palmer's of Crittenden's corps, Negley's right resting on Sheridan's left, and Palmer's right on the left of Negley, Rousseau being in reserve.
Crittenden was ordered to move Van Cleve's division across the river at the lower ford, covered and supported by the pioneer brigade and at once advance on Breckinridge.Wood's division was to follow--crossing at the upper ford and joining Van Cleve's right--when they were to press everything before them into Murfreesboro.This gave a strong attack from two divisions of Federal troops on the one of Breckinridge's, which was known to be the only one of the enemy's on the east of the river.As soon as Breckinridge had been dislodged from his position, the artillery of Wood's division was to take position on the heights east of the river and open fire on the enemy's lines on the other side, which could here be seen in reverse, and dislodge them, when Palmer was to drive them southward across the river or through the wood.Sustained by the advance of the Centre under Thomas crushing their right, Crittenden was to keep advancing, take Murfreesboro, move rapidly westward on the Franklin pike, get on their flank and rear and drive them into the country toward Salem, with the prospect of cutting off their retreat and probably destroying their army.Rosecrans called the attention of the corps commanders to the fact that this combination, which gave to him such a superiority on the left, depended for its success upon McCook's maintaining his position on the right for at least three hours, and if compelled to fall back that he should do so in the same manner he had advanced the day before, slowly and steadily, refusing his right.McCook was asked if he could hold his position for three hours, and replied that he thought he could.
The importance of doing so was again impressed upon him, and the officers then separated.
As will be seen, the plan of battle as formed by Rosecrans contemplated a feint attack by his right, which in the event of a repulse was to fall back slowly, contesting the ground stubbornly, while the main attack was to be made by the forces on the left, followed up the advance of the centre, the right to be temporarily sacrificed for the success of the general plan.Rosecrans knew that Bragg had weakened his right to support his left, looking to offensive movements on his part, and that the vital point in his own plan was the ability of McCook to hold the enemy in check on his front.
During the 30th, Bragg formed his plan of battle, which, singular as it appears, was the exact counterpart of that of the Federal commander.Hardee on the left, with McCown's and Cleburne's divisions, was to advance against the Federal right, which being forced back, Polk and Withers's and Cheatham's divisions were then to push the centre.The movement made by a steady wheel to the right on the right of Polk's command as a pivot.Bragg's plan was to drive our right and centre back against our left on Stone's River, seize our line of communication with Nashville, thus cutting us off from our base of operations and supplies, and ultimately securing the objective of his campaign, Nashville.Bragg's plan was equally as bold as that of his opponent--whose command was slightly inferior in strength to the rebel force--and the success of either depended very largely on the degree of diligence in opening the engagement.Rosecrans's orders were for the troops to breakfast before daylight and attack at seven o'clock.Bragg issued orders to attack at daylight.
