At daylight the next day Bragg gave orders to his corps commanders to feel our lines and ascertain Rosecrans's position.Fire was opened from four batteries on the centre, and a demonstration of force was made by his infantry, followed by another on McCook; but at all points meeting with a heavy artillery fire, he concluded that our army still occupied the battle field in force.Bragg ordered Wharton's and Pegram's brigades of cavalry to cross to the right bank of Stone's River immediately in Breckinridge's front.Soon after this a number of his staff officers discovered for the first time that Van Cleve's troops, sent over the day before, had quietly crossed unopposed, and had established themselves on and under cover of an eminence from which Polk's line was commanded and enfiladed.
It was an evident necessity either to withdraw Polk's line or to dislodge Van Cleve's.The first alternative was not to be entertained until the failure of an attempt to accomplish the latter.Polk was at once ordered to send over to Breckenridge the remaining brigades belonging to his division still with Polk, and Breckenridge, reporting to Bragg, received his orders.The attack was to be made with the four brigades of Breckinridge's command, the cavalry protecting his right and co-operating with him.The crest of ground near the river, where Van Cleve's division was in position, was the point against which the main attack was to be directed.This taken, Breckinridge was to bring up his artillery and establish it on the high ground, so as to enfilade our lines on the other side of the river.Polk was to open with a heavy fire on our left as Breckinridge commenced his advance.The signal for the attack was to be one gun from the centre, and four o'clock was the hour set for the firing of this gun.
Breckinridge drew up his division in two lines, the first in a narrow skirt of woods, the other some two hundred yards in rear.
General Pillow, after the first day's fighting, reporting for duty, was assigned to the command of Palmer's brigade.Pillow's and Hanson's brigades formed the first line, Preston's and Adams's brigades the second.The artillery was placed in rear of the second line, and in addition to that of his brigade, ten Napoleon guns--12-pounders--were sent to aid in the attack.
Van Cleve's division was under the command of Colonel Samuel Beatty, with Price's brigade on the right next to the river, Fyffe's brigade on the left.Grider's brigade formed Beatty's support, while a brigade of Palmer's division was placed in position on the extreme left to protect that flank.Drury's battery was posted in the rear.In front of Breckinridge's line was an open space some six hundred and fifty yards in width, with a gentle ascent which it was necessary for his troops to cross before reaching our lines.
Several hundred yards in the rear of the latter was the river, increasing the distance as it flowed beyond our left.
General Rosecrans had ordered Crittenden to send Beatty's division across the river as protection to the troops on the left and centre, as from the high ground near the river the enemy, by an enfilading fire, could sweep these portions of our line.During the morning of the 2d Negley's division was ordered from the right, and placed in position on the west bank of the river, in the rear of Beatty's division, as reserves, being here on the left of Hazen's and Cruft's brigades of Palmer's division.
As soon as Breckinridge's command entered the open ground to his front, the artillery massed on the west bank of the river by order of Crittenden, consisting of all the guns of the left wing, together with the batteries belonging to Negley's division and Stoke's battery, making 58 guns in position, opened a heavy, accurate, and destructive fire.Large numbers of the enemy fell before they reached Beatty's infantry lines.Pressing forward without waiting to throw out a skirmish line, Breckinridge's command swept onward, reckless of the artillery fire and that of the infantry, and struck Price's and Grider's brigades, broke their lines, drove them from their position on to their support in the rear, which also gave way, when the entire division retreated in broken ranks across the river, taking refuge behind the line of Negley's division, and there reforming.Breckenridge reports that he "after a brief but bloody conflict routed both the opposing lines, took 400 prisoners and several flags, and drove their artillery and the great body of their infantry across the river." His success, however, was exceedingly short-lived.Colonel John F.Miller, commanding the right brigade of Negley's division, had, in the absence of Negley in the rear, ordered the troops of his division to lie down under cover of the bluff of the river bank, and hold their fire until our troops from the other side crossed over and moved to the rear.
As soon as the last of Beatty's men had passed through Miller's lines, he commanded the division to rise and open fire on Breckinridge's troops.Miller's fire was so effectively given as to cause the enemy at once to recoil, Breckenridge's command being also under the artillery fire on the left, enfilading his ranks.His division soon wavered, and then began falling back.At this Miller-Negley still not appearing--ordered the division to charge across the river, and to drive the enemy from their line of intrenchments, which they did.While crossing, Miller received word from Palmer not to cross his command, but as the greater part of his troops were over the river driving the enemy, Miller pressed on in person, and hurried the troops last to cross, up to the support of those in the advance.He was then ordered by Palmer to recross the river, and to support the artillery on the hill on the west bank.The troops under Miller were then advancing through the cornfield, driving the enemy, and as his right flank was fully protected, he had no inclination to turn back, and he ordered the troops forward.
