If not, it is unjust to those who probably deserve most."The effect of this letter was to widen the breach between the authorities at Washington and Rosecrans.Halleck's letter and Rosecrans's reply were both characteristic of the men.Halleck, fresh from the results of a large law practice in California--principally devoted to the establishment of the validity of land grants in favor of his clients, in the success of which large contingent fees were gained--saw nothing improper in such an offer to an officer of sufficient ability and standing to be in command of one of the armies of the United States.With Rosecrans, all the honest, generous impulses of a high-principled, honorable gentleman, who had imperiled his life on many a battlefield, fighting solely from a sense of duty to his country, led to the expression of his contempt for the author of such an offer.The mistake that Halleck made was in thinking that what would prove a tempting offer to a man like himself, would be so to Rosecrans.No one will attempt to maintain the wisdom of Rosecrans's course as a matter of policy, however much they may sympathize with and admire the spirit of his letter.
It was an impolitic letter, and one that aided in drawing the ill-will and resentment of Halleck and Stanton upon him in full force later.
From this time forward, all the requests of Rosecrans for the improvement of the efficiency of his army were treated with great coolness, and in many instances it was only after the greatest importunity that he was able to secure the least attention to his recommendations for the increased usefulness of his command.His repeated applications for more cavalry, and that they be armed with revolving rifles, were treated with little attention.In the meantime nearly every communication from Washington intimated that he was unnecessarily delaying his advance upon Bragg in his works at Shelbyville and Tullahoma.Grant, on his Vicksburg campaign, became very anxious for the advance of the Army of the Cumberland, to engage Bragg and prevent reinforcements being sent from him to Pemberton or Johnston, operating on his front and rear; and urged Rosecrans to move, and wrote to Halleck, requesting him to direct an advance of the Army of the Cumberland on Bragg's position.
Rosecrans regarded it for the best interest of the country for his army to remain constantly threatening Bragg, in order to hold the entire army of the latter in his immediate front, and also in the event of the defeat of Grant, and a concentration of the enemy on Rosecrans's position, that he should be close to his base, his army being then the reserve.If an advance succeeded in driving Bragg from Tullahoma, a greater danger than his remaining inactive on our front might ensue.To Bragg, the occupancy of Middle Tennessee was of sufficient importance to justify him in remaining inactive with his entire command, waiting for the advance of Rosecrans some six months.If driven from Tennessee, his troops were ready to unite with the command in Mississippi and defeat Grant's movements.
If Bragg could be held in Tennessee after until after Grant's success was assured, then, by waiting at Murfreesboro with his army quiet, Rosecrans could render better service than by moving on the enemy.
This was a matter of military judgment, on one side espoused by Rosecrans and all his corps and division commanders, who were on the ground, and on the other by Halleck, Stanton, and Grant; and this question served to increase the feeling against Rosecrans in those quarters.Bragg also considered that his presence on the front of the Federal army would prevent any troops from it being sent to aid Grant.And thus the year wore away until early summer.
Still another consideration with Rosecrans, was the character of the soil in Tennessee from a short distance south of Murfreesboro to the foot of the Cumberland Mountains.This was a light sandy loam, that in winter and spring, during the rains of those seasons, became like quicksand, allowing the artillery and wagon to sink almost to the hub, and rendering the rapid movement of a large army absolutely impossible.
During the early part of June, Rosecrans commenced placing his troops in position, preparatory to a general advance.He ordered the brigade that had been encamped at Gallatin, under General Ward, to Lavergne, and despatched Gordon Granger to take post at Triune, moving his command from Franklin up to that place.Crook was ordered from Carthage to report to Murfreesboro, and on his arrival, was placed in Reynolds's division.Rosecrans organized a reserve corps, consisting of three divisions designated as First, Second, and Third, under Baird, J.D.Morgan, and R.S.Granger, respectively, and he assigned Gordon Granger to the command of this corps.
Early in June, Garfield, then Chief-of-Staff of the General commanding, urged Rosecrans to make an advance movement, both as a military and political measure with reference to the sentiment of the North.General Rosecrans had matured his plans for an advance, but decided to refer the question to his general officers in command of corps and divisions.The matter being submitted to them, the universal sentiment of these officers was that the movement should be further delayed.However, on the 23rd of June, Rosecrans having made all necessary arrangements for his command, according to his plans, and learning of the favorable prospects at Vicksburg, and of the movement of the force under Burnside into East Tennessee to take and hold Knoxville, issued the necessary orders for the advance of his army on that of the enemy.
