Comte,in any case,regarding sociology as a science,considers the dependence of political institutions upon social structure to be much closer than Mill would admit.The power of the legislator to alter society is strictly subordinate and dependent throughout upon its relation to the existing organism.In his study of Comte,(32)Mill declares emphatically that Comte's work has made it necessary for all later thinkers to start from a 'connected view of the great facts of history.'He speaks with enthusiasm of Comte's great survey of history,and fully accepts the principle.
Yet,in fact,he scarcely applies the method in his political system,and accepts a doctrine really inconsistent with it.His anxiety to give a far wider sphere to the possibilities of modifying,leads him to regard institutions as the ultimate causes of change,instead of factors themselves strictly dependent upon deeper causes.Hence he substitutes a different distinction.We are to judge of institutions by their efficiency as educating agencies,on the one hand,and as the means of carrying on 'public business'on the other.Institutions should do their work well,and turn the workers into good citizens.(33)The educative influence of government is thus his characteristic point.The 'ideally best form of government,'as Mill of course admits,is not one applicable 'at all stages of civilisation.'(34)We have to suppose certain conditions,and he takes pain to show in what cases his ideal would be inapplicable.(35)But,given the stage reached in modern times (as he practically assumes),there is 'no difficulty in showing'the ideal form to be the representative system;that in which 'sovereignty is vested in the entire aggregate of the community,'every citizen having a voice and taking at least an occasional part in discharging the functions of government.(36)This applies the doctrine already expounded in the Liberty.Citizens should be 'self-protecting and self-protective';(37)the 'active,'not the 'passive'type of character should be encouraged.The striving,go-ahead character of Anglo-Saxons is only objectionable so far as it is directed to petty ends;the Englishman says naturally,'What a shame!'when the Frenchman says,'Il faut de la patience!'and the institutions which encourage this energetic character by giving a vote to all,by permitting freedom of speech,and by permitting all men to discharge small duties (to act on juries for example)are the best.I will only note that this tends to beg the important question,Are the institutions really the cause or the effect?
Has the energy of the English race made their institutions free?or have the free institutions made them energetic?or are the institutions and the character collateral effects of a great variety of causes?When so much stress is laid upon the educational effect --of serving upon a jury,for instance --we are impelled to ask what is the ultimate cause.Are people so much morally improved by serving on juries?If the institution like the 'water-mill'only directs certain instincts already existing,we must not speak as if the mill made the water.power;and Mill's arguments suggest a liability to this fallacy.It becomes important at the next stage.
The ideal form of government has its infirmities,as Mill insists.Two are conspicuous:the difficulty of inducing a democracy to intrust work which requires skill to those who possess skill;(38)and the old difficulty --the 'tyranny of the majority.'Mill's contention that the 'Demos'may be stupid,mistake its own interests,and impress its mistaken views upon the legislation,needs no exposition.We are thus brought to the question how the ideal government is to be so constituted that the interests of a section --even if it be the majority --may not be so powerful as to overwhelm the other sections even when backed by 'truth and justice.'(39)Danger of popular stupidity and danger of class legislation indicate two great evils to be abated as far as possible by 'human contrivance.'(40)Asufficient 'contrivance'was in fact revealed at the right moment.A discovery of surpassing value had been announced by one of his friends.Hare's scheme of representation,says Mill with characteristic enthusiasm,has the 'almost unparalleled merit'of securing its special aim in almost 'ideal perfection,'while incidentally attaining others of almost equal importance.He places it among the very greatest 'improvements yet made in the theory and practice of government.'(41)It would,for example,be almost a 'specific'against the tendency of republics to ostracise their ablest men.(42)And it would be the appropriate organ of the great function of 'antagonism'(43)which now takes the place of contradiction in intellectual development.There will always be some body to oppose the supreme power,and thus to prevent the stagnation,followed by decay,which has always resulted from a complete victory.
Is not the 'water-mill'here expected to work the river?The faith in a bit of mechanism of 'human contrivance'becomes sublime.Hare's scheme may have great conveniences under many circumstances.But that Hare's scheme or any scheme should regenerate politics seems to be a visionary belief,unworthy of Mill's higher moods.He seems to fall into the error too common among legislative theorists,of assuming that an institution will be worked for the ends of the contriver,instead of asking to what ends it may be distorted by the ingenuity of all who can turn it to account for their own purposes.There is a more vital difficulty.If Hare's scheme worked as Mill expected it to work,one result would be necessarily implied.The House of Commons would reflect accurately all the opinions of the country.
