which they did with so little success，that Grave and Maestricht alone remained to him of all the boasted conquests he had made；and even these he offered two years afterwards to restore，if by that concession he could have prevailed on the Dutch at that time to make peace with him.But they were not yet disposed to abandon their allies；for allies now they had.The emperor and the king of Spain had engaged in the quarrel against France，and many of the princes of the empire had done the same.Not all.The Bavarian continued obstinate in his neutrality，and，to mention no more，the Swedes made a great diversion in favor of France in the empire；where the Duke of Hanover abetted their designs as much as he could，for he was a zealous partisan of France，though the other princes of his house acted for the common cause.I descend into no more particulars.The war that Louis the Fourteenth kindled by attacking in so violent a manner the Dutch commonwealth，and by making so arbitrary an use of his first success，became general，in the Low Countries，in Spain，in Sicily，on the upper and lower Rhine，in Denmark，in Sweden，and in the provinces of Germany belonging to these two crowns；on the Mediterranean，the Ocean，and the Baltic.France supported this war with advantage on every side：and when your lordship considers in what manner it was carried on against her，you will not be surprised that she did so.Spain had spirit，but too little strength to maintain her power in Sicily，where Messina had revolted；to defend her frontier on that side of the Pyrenees；and to resist the great efforts of the French in the Low Countries.The empire was divided；and，even among the princes who acted against France，there was neither union in their councils，nor concert in their projects，nor order in preparations，nor vigor in execution：and，to say the truth，there was not，in the whole confederacy，a man whose abilities could make him a match for the Prince of Condéor the Marshal of Turenne；nor many who were in any degree equal to Luxemburg，Crequi，Schomberg，and other generals of inferior note，who commanded the armies of France.The emperor took this very time to make new invasions on the liberties of Hungary，and to oppress his protestant subjects.The Prince of Orange alone acted with invincible firmness，like a patriot，and a hero.Neither the seductions of France nor those of England，neither the temptations of ambition nor those of private interest，could make him swerve from the true interest of his country，nor from the common interest of Europe.He had raised more sieges，and lost more battles，it was said，than any general of his age had done.Be it so.But his defeats were manifestly due in a great measure to circumstances independent on him：
and that spirit，which even these defeats could not depress，was all his own.He had difficulties in his own commonwealth；the governors of the Spanish Low Countries crossed his measure sometimes；the German allies disappointed and broke them often：and it is not improbable that he was frequently betrayed.
He was so perhaps even by Souches，the imperial general；a Frenchman according to Bayle，and a pensioner of Louvois according to common report，and very strong appearances，He had not yet credit and authority sufficient to make him a centre of union to a whole confederacy，the soul that animated and directed so great a body.
He came to be such afterwards；but at the time spoken of，he could not take so great a part upon him.No other prince or general was equal to it：
and the consequences of this defect appeared almost in every operation.France was surrounded by a multitude of enemies，all intent to demolish her power.
But，like the builders of Babel，they spoke different languages：and as those could not build，these could not demolish，for want of understanding one another.France improved this advantage by her arms，and more by her negotiations.
Nimeguen was，after Cologne，the scene of these.England was the mediating power，and I know not whether our Charles the Second did not serve her purposes more usefully in the latter，and under the character of mediator，than he did or could have done by joining his arms to hers，and acting as her ally，The Dutch were induced to sign a treaty with him，that broke the confederacy，and gave great advantage to France：for the purport of it was to oblige Spain to make peace on a plan to be proposed to them，and no mention was made in it of the other allies that I remember.The Dutch were glad to get out of an expensive war.France promised to restore Maestricht to them，and Maestricht was the only place that remained unrecovered of all they had lost.They dropped Spain at Nimeguen，as they had dropped France at Munster；but many circumstances concurred to give a much worse grace to their abandoning of Spain，than to their abandoning of France.I need not specify them.This only I would observe：
when they made a separate peace at Munster，they left an ally who was in condition to carry on the war alone with advantage，and they presumed to impose no terms upon him：when they made a separate peace at Nimeguen，they abandoned an ally who was in no condition to carry on the war alone，and who was reduced to accept whatever terms the common enemy prescribed.
