Prop. XIV. The mind can bring it about, that all bodily modifications or images of things may be referred to the idea of God.
Proof.- There is no modification of the body, whereof the mind may not form some clear and distinct conception (V:iv.); wherefore it can bring it about, that they should all be referred to the idea of God (I:xv.). Q.E.D.
Prop. XV. He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his emotions loves God, and so much the more in proportion as he more understands himself and his emotions.
Proof.- He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his emotions feels pleasure (III:liii.), and this pleasure is (by the last Prop.) accompanied by the idea of God; therefore (Def. of the Emotions:vi.) such an one loves God, and (for the same reason) so much the more in proportion as he more understands himself and his emotions. Q.E.D.
Prop. XVI. This love towards God must hold the chief place in the mind.
Proof.- For this love is associated with all the modifications of the body (V:xiv.) and is fostered by them all (V:v.); therefore (V:xi.), it must hold the chief place in the mind. Q.E.D.
Prop. XVII. God is without passions, neither is he affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain.
Proof.- All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God, are true (II:xxxii.), that is (II:Def.iv.) adequate; and therefore (by the general Def. of the Emotions) God is without passions. Again, God cannot pass either to a greater or to a lesser perfection (I:xx.Coroll.ii.); therefore (by Def. of the Emotions:ii., &iii.) he is not affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain.
Corollary. Strictly speaking, God does not love or hate anyone. For God (by the foregoing Prop.) is not affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain, consequently (Def. of the Emotions:vi., &vii.) he does not love or hate anyone.
Prop.XVIII. No one can hate God.
Proof.- The idea of God which is in us is adequate and perfect (II:xlvi., II:xlvii.); wherefore, in so far as we contemplate God, we are active (III:iii.); consequently (III:lix.) there can be no pain accompanied by the idea of God, in other words (Def. of the Emotions:vii.), no one can hate God. Q.E.D.
Corollary.- Love towards God cannot be turned into hate.
Note.- It may be objected that, as we understand God as the cause of all things, we by that very fact regard God as the cause of pain. But I make answer, that, in so far as we understand the causes of pain, it to that extent (V:iii.) ceases to be a passion, that is, it ceases to be pain (III:lix.); therefore, in so far as we understand God to be the cause of pain, we to that extent feel pleasure.
Prop. XIX. He, who loves God, cannot endeavour that God should love him in return.
Proof.- For, if a man should so endeavour, he would desire (V:xvii.Coroll.) that God, whom he loves, should not be God, and consequently he would desire to feel pain (III:xix.); which is absurd (III:xxviii.). Therefore, he who loves God, &c. Q.E.D.
Prop. XX. This love towards God cannot be stained by the emotion of envy or jealousy: contrariwise, it is the more fostered, in proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to be joined to God by the same bond of love.
Proof.- This love towards God is the highest good which we can seek for under the guidance of reason (IV:xxviii.), it is common to all men (IV:xxxvi),and we desire that all should rejoice therein (IV:xxxvii.); therefore (Def. of the Emotions:xxiii), it cannot be stained by the emotion envy nor by, the emotion of jealousy, (V:xviii. see definition of Jealousy, (III:xxxv. Note); but, contrariwise, it must needs be the more fostered, in proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to rejoice therein. Q.E.D.
Note.- We can in the same way, show, that there is no emotion directly contrary to this love, whereby this love can be destroyed; therefore we may conclude, that this love towards God is the most constant of all the emotions, and that, in so far as it is referred to the body, it cannot be destroyed, unless the body be destroyed also. As to its nature, in so far as it is referred to the mind only, we shall presently inquire.
I have now gone through all the remedies against the emotions, or all that the mind, considered in itself alone, can do against them. Whence it appears that the mind's power over the emotions consists:-
I. In the actual knowledge of the emotions (V:iv.Note).
II. In the fact that it separates the emotions from the thought of an external cause, which we conceive confusedly (V:ii. and V:iv.Note).
III. In the fact, that, in respect to time, the emotions referred to things, which we distinctly understand, surpass those referred to what we conceive in a confused and fragmentary manner (V:vii.).
IV. In the number of causes whereby those modifications (Affectiones.
Camerer reads affectus - emotions), are fostered, which have regard to the common properties of things or to God (V:ix., V:xi.).
V. Lastly, in the order wherein the mind can arrange and associate, one with another, its own emotions (V:x.Note and V:xii., V:xiii., V:xiv.).
