On the 30th of March, Spain abrogated the reconcentrado policy in the "western provinces of Cuba," and on the following day offered to arbitrate the questions arising out of the sinking of the Maine.On Sunday, the 3d of April, a cablegram from General Woodford was received by the State Department indicating that Spain was seeking a formula for an armistice that should not too obviously appear to be submission and suggesting that the President ask the Pope to intervene and that the United States abstain from all show of force."If you can still give me time and reasonable liberty of action," ran Woodford's message, "Iwill get you the peace you desire so much and for which you have labored so hard." To this the Secretary of State immediately replied that the President would not ask the intervention of the Pope, and that the Government would use the fleet as it saw fit.
"Would the peace you are so confident of securing," asked the Secretary, "mean the independence of Cuba? The President cannot hold his message longer than Tuesday." On Tuesday, the 5th of April, General Woodford cabled:
"Should the Queen proclaim the following before twelve o'clock noon of Wednesday, April 6th, will you sustain the Queen, and can you prevent hostile action by Congress? "At the request of the Holy Father, in this Passion Week and in the name of Christ, Iproclaim immediate and unconditional suspension of hostilities in the island of Cuba.This suspension is to become immediately effective as soon as accepted by the insurgents of that island, and is to continue for the space of six months to the 5th day of October, 1898.I do this to give time for passions to cease, and in the sincere hope and belief that during this suspension permanent and honorable peace may be obtained between the insular government of Cuba and those of my subjects in that island who are now in rebellion against the authority of Spain...."Please read this in the light of all my previous telegrams and letters.I believe this means peace, which the sober judgment of our people will approve long before next November, and which must be approved at the bar of final history."To this message the Secretary of State replied:
"The President highly appreciates the Queen's desire for peace.
He cannot assume to influence the action of the American Congress beyond a discharge of his constitutional duty in transmitting the whole matter to them with such recommendations as he deems necessary and expedient."On the 9th of April the Queen granted the amnesty, on the formula of a request by the European powers.On the next day, General Woodford cabled that the United States could obtain for Cuba a satisfactory autonomy, or independence, or the cession of the island.
It was evident that there was no difference of opinion among those in authority in the United States as to the fact that Cuba must be severed from Spain.There were, however, differences of judgment as to which of the three methods suggested by Woodford was preferable, and there was a substantial disagreement as to the means necessary to realize the aims of the American Government.General Woodford believed that Spain would grant the demands of the United States, if she were given time and were not pressed to the point of endangering her dignity.The overwhelming majority in Congress, and particularly the leaders of the dominant Republican party with the exception of Speaker Reed, refused to believe in the sincerity of the Spanish Government.
The Administration could not overlook the fact that the Spanish Government, however sincere it might be, might not be able to execute its promises.Great Britain had just recognized the United States as intermediary in a dispute between herself and one of the American nations.Spain, in a dispute much more serious to the United States, refused publicly to admit American intervention, while she did recognize that of the Pope and the European powers.Was it then possible that a Government which was either unwilling or afraid openly to acknowledge American interest in April would, by October, yield to the wishes of the Administration? Was it certain or likely that if the Spanish Government did so yield, it would remain in power?
Reluctantly President McKinley decided that he could not announce to Congress that he had secured the acceptance of the American policy.In his message to Congress on the 11th of April, he reviewed the negotiation and concluded by recommending forcible intervention.On the 19th of April, Congress, by joint resolution, called upon Spain to withdraw from Cuba and authorized the President to use force to compel her to do so.
Congress, however, was not content to leave the future of the island merely indefinite, but added that the United States did not desire Cuba and that the "people of the island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent." This decision ruled out both autonomy and cession as solutions of the problem.
It put an end to the American century-long dream of annexing Cuba, unless the people of the island themselves desired such a relation; and it practically determined the recognition of the unstable Cuban Government then in existence.This decision on the part of Congress, however, reflected the deep-seated conviction of the American people regarding freedom and plainly put the issue where the popular majority wished it to be--upon a basis of unselfish sympathy with struggling neighbors.
The resolution was signed by the President on the 20th of April.
On the following day, Admiral Sampson's fleet left Key West with orders to blockade the coast of Cuba, and, in the absence of a formal declaration of war, this strategic move may be considered as its actual beginning.On the 25th of April, Congress declared "that, war be, and the same is hereby, declared to exist, and that war has existed since the twenty-first of April, Anno Domini, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, including the said day, between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain."
