The other point was raised by the American commissioners, and was both more important and more complicated, for when the negotiation began the United States had not fully decided what it wanted.It was necessary first to decide and then to obtain the consent of Spain with regard to the great unsettled question of the disposition of the Philippines.Dewey's victory came as an overwhelming surprise to the great majority of Americans snugly encased, as they supposed themselves to be, in a separate hemisphere.Nearly all looked upon it as a military operation only, not likely to lead to later complications.Many discerning individuals, however, both in this country and abroad, at once saw or feared that occupation would lead to annexation.Carl Schurz, as early as the 9th of May, wrote McKinley expressing the hope that "we remain true to our promise that this is a war of deliverance and not one of greedy ambition, conquest, self-aggrandizement." In August, Andrew Carnegie wrote in "The North American Review" an article on "Distant Possessions--The Parting of the Ways."Sentiment in favor of retaining the islands, however, grew rapidly in volume and in strength.John Hay wrote to Andrew Carnegie on the 22d of August: "I am not allowed to say in my present fix (ministerial responsibility) how much I agree with you.The only question in my mind is how far it is now POSSIBLEfor us to withdraw from the Philippines.I am rather thankful it is not given to me to solve that momentous question." On the 5th of September, he wrote to John Bigelow: "I fear you are right about the Philippines, and I hope the Lord will be good to us poor devils who have to take care of them.I marvel at your suggesting that we pay for them.I should have expected no less of your probity; but how many except those educated by you in the school of morals and diplomacy would agree with you? Where did Ipass you on the road of life? You used to be a little my senior [twenty-one years]; now you are ages younger and stronger than Iam.And yet I am going to be Secretary of State for a little while."Not all those who advocated the retention of the Philippines did so reluctantly or under the pressure of a feeling of necessity.
In the very first settlers of our country, the missionary impulse beat strong.John Winthrop was not less intent than Cromwell on the conquest of all humanity by his own ideals; only he believed the most efficacious means to be the power of example instead of force.Just now there was a renewed sense throughout the Anglo-Saxon public that it was the duty of the civilized to promote the civilization of the backward, and the Cromwellian method waxed in popularity.Kipling, at the summit of his influence, appealed to a wide and powerful public in his "White Man's Burden," which appeared in 1899.
Take up the White Man's burden--
Send forth the best ye breed--
Go bind your sons to exile To serve your captives' need;To wait in heavy harness, On fluttered folk and wild--Your new caught, sullen peoples, Half-devil and half-child.
Take up the White Man's burden--
And reap his old reward The blame of those ye better, The hate of those ye guard--The cry of hosts ye humour (Ah, slowly!) towards the light:--Why brought ye us from bondage, Our loved Egyptian night?
McKinley asked those having opinions on the subject of this burden to write to him, and a strong call for the United States to take up her share in the regeneration of mankind came from important representatives of the religious public.Nor was the attitude of those different who saw the possibilities of increased traffic with the East.The expansion of the area of home distribution seemed a halfway house between the purely nationalistic policy, which was becoming a little irksome, and the competition of the open world.
It was not, however, the urging of these forces alone which made the undecided feel that the annexation of the Philippines was bound to come.The situation itself seemed to offer no other solution.Gradually evidence as to the local conditions reached America.The Administration was anxious for the commissioners to have the latest information, and, as Admiral Dewey remained indispensable at Manila, General Merritt was ordered to report at Paris, where he arrived on the 6th of October.He was of the opinion that the Americans must remain in the Philippines, and his reports were sustained by a cablegram from Dewey on the 14th of October reading: "Spanish authority has been completely destroyed in Luzon, and general anarchy prevails without the limits of the city and Bay of Manila.Strongly probable that islands to the south will fall into the same state soon." The history of the previous few years and existing conditions made it highly improbable that Spanish domination could ever be restored.
The withdrawal of the United States would therefore not mean the reestablishment of Spanish rule but no government at all.
As to the regime which would result from our withdrawal, Admiral Dewey judged from the condition of those areas where Spanish authority had already ceased and that of the Americans had not yet been established."Distressing reports," he cabled, "have been received of inhuman cruelty practised on religious and civil authorities in other parts of these islands.The natives appear unable to govern." It was highly probable, in fact, that if the United States did not take the islands, Spain would sell her vanishing equity in the property to some other power which possessed the equipment necessary to conquer the Philippines.To many this eventuality did not seem objectionable, as is indicated by the remark, already quoted, of an American official to certain Germans: "We don't want the Philippines; why don't you take them?" That this attitude was foolishly Quixotic is obvious, but more effective in the molding of public opinion was the feeling that it was cowardly.
