13. The sum of these rights of sovereignty, namely the absolute use of the sword in peace and war, the making and abrogating of laws, supreme judicature and decision in all debates judicial and deliberative, the nomination of all magistrates and ministers, with other rights contained in the same, make the sovereign power no less absolute in the commonwealth, than before commonwealth every man was absolute in himself to do, or not to do, what he thought good; which men that have not had the experience of that miserable estate, to which men are reduced by long war, think so hard a condition that they cannot easily acknowledge, such covenants and subjection, on their parts, as are here set down, to have been ever necessary to their peace. And therefore some have imagined that a commonwealth may be constituted in such manner, as the sovereign power may be so limited, and moderated, as they shall think fit themselves.
For example: they suppose a multitude of men to have agreed upon certain articles (which they presently call laws), declaring how they will be governed; and that done to agree farther upon some man, or number of men to see the same articles performed, and put in execution. And to enable him, or them thereunto, they allot unto them a provision limited, as of certain lands, taxes, penalties, and the like, than which (if mis-spent), they shall have no more, without a new consent of the same men that allowed the former. And thus they think they have made a commonwealth, in which it is unlawful for any private man to make use of his own sword for his security; wherein they deceive themselves.
14. For first, if to the revenue, it did necessarily follow that there might be forces raised, and procured at the will of him that hath such revenue; yet since the revenue is limited, so must also be the forces; but limited forces, against the power of an enemy, which we cannot limit, are unsufficient. Whensoever therefore there happeneth an invasion greater than those forces are able to resist, and there be no other right to levy more, then is every man, by necessity of nature, allowed to make the best provision he can for himself; and thus is the private sword, and the estate of war again reduced. But seeing revenue, without the right of commanding men, is of not use, neither in peace, nor war; it is necessary to be supposed, that he that hath the administration of those articles, which are in the former section supposed, must have also right to make use of the strengths of particular men; and what reason soever giveth him that right over any one, giveth him the same over them all. And then is his right absolute; for he that hath right to all their forces, hath right to dispose of the same. Again: supposing those limited forces and revenue, either by the necessary, or negligent use of them, to fail; and that for a supply, the same multitude be again to be assembled, who shall have power to assemble them, that is to compel them to come together? If he that demandeth the supply hath that right (viz.) the right to compel them all; then is his sovereignty absolute: if not, then is every particular man at liberty to come or not; to frame a new commonwealth or not; and so the right of the private sword returneth. But suppose them willingly and of their own accord assembled, to consider of this supply; if now it be still in their choice, whether they shall give it or not, it is also in their choice whether the commonwealth shall stand or not. And therefore there lieth not upon any of them any civil obligation that may hinder them from using force, in case they think it tend to their defence. This device therefore of them that will make civil laws first, and then a civil body afterwards, (as if policy made a body politic, and not a body politic made policy) is of no effect.
15. Others to avoid the hard condition, as they take it, of absolute subjection, (which in hatred thereto they also call slavery) have devised a government as they think mixed of the three sorts of sovereignty. As for example: they suppose the power of making laws given to some great assembly democratical, the power of judicature to some other assembly; and the administration of the laws to a third, or to some one man; and this policy they call mixed monarchy, or mixed aristocracy, or mixed democracy, according as any of these three sorts do most visibly predominate. And in this estate of government they think the use of the private sword excluded.
