The soldiers who fought through the war to victory or to defeat had been at home nearly two years before the radicals developed sufficient strength to carry through their plans for a revolutionary reconstruction of the Southern states.At the end of the war, a majority of the Northern people would have supported a settlement in accordance with Lincoln's policy.Eight months later a majority, but a smaller one, would have supported Johnson's work had it been possible to secure a popular decision on it.How then did the radicals gain the victory over the conservatives? The answer to this question is given by James Ford Rhodes in terms of personalities: "Three men are responsible for the Congressional policy of Reconstruction: Andrew Johnson, by his obstinacy and bad behavior; Thaddeus Stevens, by his vindictiveness and parliamentary tyranny; Charles Sumner, by his pertinacity in a misguided humanitarianism."The President stood alone in his responsibility, but his chief opponents were the ablest leaders of a resolute band of radicals.
Radicalism did not begin in the Administration of Andrew Johnson.Lincoln had felt its covert opposition throughout the war, but he possessed the faculty of weakening his opponents, while Johnson's conduct usually multiplied the number and the strength of his enemies.At first the radicals criticized Lincoln's policy in regard to slavery, and after the Emancipation Proclamation they shifted their attack to his "ten percent" plan for organizing the state governments as outlined in the Proclamation of December 1863.Lincoln's course was distasteful to them because he did not admit the right of Congress to dictate terms, because of his liberal attitude towards former Confederates, and because he was conservative on the Negro question.A schism among the Republican supporters of the war was with difficulty averted in 1864, when Fremont threatened to lead the radicals in opposition to the "Union" party of the President and his conservative policy.
The breach was widened by the refusal of Congress to admit representatives from Arkansas and Louisiana in 1864 and to count the electoral vote of Louisiana and Tennessee in 1865.The passage of the Wade-Davis reconstruction bill in July 1864, and the protests of its authors after Lincoln's pocket veto called attention to the growing opposition.Severe criticism caused Lincoln to withdraw the propositions which he had made in April 1865, with regard to the restoration of Virginia.In his last public speech, he referred with regret to the growing spirit of vindictiveness toward the South.Much of the opposition to Lincoln's Southern policy was based not on radicalism, that is, not on any desire for a revolutionary change in the South, but upon a belief that Congress and not the executive should be entrusted with the work of reorganizing the Union.Many congressional leaders were willing to have Congress itself carry through the very policies which Lincoln had advocated, and a majority of the Northern people would have endorsed them without much caring who was to execute them.
The murder of Lincoln, the failure of the radicals to shape Johnson's policy as they had hoped, and the continuing reaction against the excessive expansion of the executive power added strength to the opposition.But it was a long fight before the radical leaders won.Their victory was due to adroit tactics on their own part and to mistakes, bad judgment, and bad manners on the part of the President.When all hope of controlling Johnson had been given up, Thaddeus Stevens and other leaders of similar views began to contrive means to circumvent him.On December 1, 1865, before Congress met, a caucus of radicals held in Washington agreed that a joint committee of the two Houses should be selected to which should be referred matters relating to reconstruction.This plan would thwart the more conservative Senate and gain a desirable delay in which the radicals might develop their campaign.The next day at a caucus of the Union party the plan went through without arousing the suspicion of the supporters of the Administration.Next, through the influence of Stevens, Edward McPherson, the clerk of the House, omitted from the roll call of the House the names of the members from the South.The radical program was then adopted and a week later the Senate concurred in the action of the House as to the appointment of a Joint Committee on Reconstruction.
On the issues before Congress both Houses were split into rather clearly defined factions: the extreme radicals with such leaders as Stevens, Sumner, Wade, and Boutwell; the moderate Republicans, chief among whom were Fessenden and Trumbull; the administration Republicans led by Raymond, Doolittle, Cowan, and Dixon; and the Democrats, of whom the ablest were Reverdy Johnson, Guthrie, and Hendricks.All except the extreme radicals were willing to support the President or to come to some fairly reasonable compromise.But at no time were they given an opportunity to get together.Johnson and the administration leaders did little in this direction and the radicals made the most skillful use of the divisions among the conservatives.
