We must show not only that the heaven is one, but also that more than one heaven is and, further, that, as exempt from decay and generation, the heaven is eternal.We may begin by raising a difficulty.From one point of view it might seem impossible that the heaven should be one and unique, since in all formations and products whether of nature or of art we can distinguish the shape in itself and the shape in combination with matter.For instance the form of the sphere is one thing and the gold or bronze sphere another;
the shape of the circle again is one thing, the bronze or wooden circle another.For when we state the essential nature of the sphere or circle we do not include in the formula gold or bronze, because they do not belong to the essence, but if we are speaking of the copper or gold sphere we do include them.We still make the distinction even if we cannot conceive or apprehend any other example beside the particular thing.This may, of course, sometimes be the case: it might be, for instance, that only one circle could be found; yet none the less the difference will remain between the being of circle and of this particular circle, the one being form, the other form in matter, i.e.a particular thing.Now since the universe is perceptible it must be regarded as a particular; for everything that is perceptible subsists, as we know, in matter.But if it is a particular, there will be a distinction between the being of 'this universe' and of 'universe' unqualified.There is a difference, then, between 'this universe' and simple 'universe'; the second is form and shape, the first form in combination with matter;
and any shape or form has, or may have, more than one particular instance.
On the supposition of Forms such as some assert, this must be the case, and equally on the view that no such entity has a separate existence.For in every case in which the essence is in matter it is a fact of observation that the particulars of like form are several or infinite in number.Hence there either are, or may be, more heavens than one.On these grounds, then, it might be inferred either that there are or that there might be several heavens.We must, however, return and ask how much of this argument is correct and how much not.
Now it is quite right to say that the formula of the shape apart from the matter must be different from that of the shape in the matter, and we may allow this to be true.We are not, however, therefore compelled to assert a plurality of worlds.Such a plurality is in fact impossible if this world contains the entirety of matter, as in fact it does.But perhaps our contention can be made clearer in this way.Suppose 'aquilinity' to be curvature in the nose or flesh, and flesh to be the matter of aquilinity.Suppose further, that all flesh came together into a single whole of flesh endowed with this aquiline quality.Then neither would there be, nor could there arise, any other thing that was aquiline.Similarly, suppose flesh and bones to be the matter of man, and suppose a man to be created of all flesh and all bones in indissoluble union.The possibility of another man would be removed.Whatever case you took it would be the same.The general rule is this: a thing whose essence resides in a substratum of matter can never come into being in the absence of all matter.Now the universe is certainly a particular and a material thing: if however, it is composed not of a part but of the whole of matter, then though the being of 'universe' and of 'this universe' are still distinct, yet there is no other universe, and no possibility of others being made, because all the matter is already included in this.It remains, then, only to prove that it is composed of all natural perceptible body.
