That freedom is an active and not a passive principle results from its very conception;but that liberty itself should be an effect of nature (taking this word in its widest sense),and not the work of man,and therefore that it can be favoured or thwarted by natural means,is the necessary consequence of that which precedes.It begins only when man is complete,and when these two fundamental impulsions have been developed.It will then be wanting whilst he is incomplete,and while one of these impulsions is excluded,and it will be re-established by all that gives back to man his integrity.
Thus it is possible,both with regard to the entire species as to the individual,to remark the moment when man is yet incomplete,and when one of the two exclusions acts solely in him.We know that man commences by life simply,to end by form;that he is more of an individual than a person,and that he starts from the limited or finite to approach the infinite.
The sensuous impulsion comes into play therefore before the rational impulsion,because sensation precedes consciousness;and in this priority of sensuous impulsion we find the key of the history of the whole of human liberty.
There is a moment,in fact,when the instinct of life,not yet opposed to the instinct of form,acts as nature and as necessity;when the sensuous is a power because man has not begun;for even in man there can be no other power than his will.But when man shall have attained to the power of thought,reason,on the contrary,will be a power,and moral or logical necessity will take the place of physical necessity.Sensuous power must then be annihilated before the law which must govern it can be established.It is not enough that something shall begin which as yet was not;previously something must end which had begun.Man cannot pass immediately from sensuousness to thought.He must step backwards,for it is only when one determination is suppressed that the contrary determination can take place.Consequently,in order to exchange passive against active liberty,a passive determination against an active,he must be momentarily free from all determination,and must traverse a state of pure determinability.He has then to return in some degree to that state of pure negative indetermination in which he was before his senses were affected by anything.But this state was absolutely empty of all contents,and now the question is to reconcile an equal determination and a determinability equally without limit,with the greatest possible fullness,because from this situation something positive must immediately follow.The determination which man received by sensation must be preserved,because he should not lose the reality;but at the same time,in so far as finite,it should be suppressed,because a determinability without limit would take place.The problem consists then in annihilating the determination of the mode of existence,and yet at the same time in preserving it,which is only possible in one way:in opposing to it another.
The two sides of a balance are in equilibrium when empty;they are also in equilibrium when their contents are of equal weight.
Thus,to pass from sensation to thought,the soul traverses a medium position,in which sensibility and reason are at the same time active,and thus they mutually destroy their determinant power,and by their antagonism produce a negation.This medium situation in which the soul is neither physically nor morally constrained,and yet is in both ways active,merits essentially the name of a free situation;and if we call the state of sensuous determination physical,and the state of rational determination logical or moral,that state of real and active determination should be called the aesthetic.
