"Louis is not devoid of intelligence， and has a good heart， but even with these qualifications a man may commit many errors， and do a great deal of mischief. Louis is naturally inclined to be capricious and fantastical， and the works of Jean Jacques Rousseau have contributed to increase this disposition. Seeking to obtain a reputation for sensibility and beneficence， incapable by himself of enlarged views， and， at most， competent to local details， Louis acted like a prefect rather than a King.
"No sooner had he arrived in Holland than， fancying that nothing could be finer than to have it said that be was thenceforth a true Dutchman， he attached himself entirely to the party favourable to the English， promoted smuggling， and than connived with our enemies.
It became necessary from that moment watch over him， and even threaten to wage war against him. Louis then seeking a refuge against the weakness of his disposition in the most stubborn obstinacy， and mistaking a public scandal for an act of glory， fled from his throne， declaiming against me and against my insatiable ambition， my intolerable tyranny， etc. What then remained for me to do？ Was I to abandon Holland to our enemies？ Ought I to have given it another King？ But is that case could I have expected more from him than from my own brother？ Did not all the Kings that I created act nearly in the same manner？ I therefore united Holland to the Empire， and this act produced a most unfavourable impression in Europe， and contributed not a little to lay the foundation of our misfortunes" (Memorial de Sainte Helene)]--第一章CHAPTER XVIII
1809.
Demands for contingents from some of the small States of Germany--M. Metternich--Position of Russia with respect to France--Union of Austria and Russia--Return of the English to Spain--Soult King of Portugal， and Murat successor to the Emperor--First levy of the landwehr in Austria--Agents of the Hamburg 'Correspondent'--Declaration of Prince Charles--Napoleon's march to Germany--His proclamation--Bernadotte's departure for the army--Napoleon's dislike of Bernadotte--Prince Charles' plan of campaign--The English at Cuxhaven--Fruitlessness of the plots of England--Napoleon wounded--Napoleon's prediction realised--Major Schill--Hamburg threatened and saved--Schill in Lubeck--His death， and destruction of his band--Schill imitated by the Duke of Brunswick-OEls--Departure of the English from Cuxhaven.
Bonaparte， the foundations of whose Empire were his sword and his. victories， and who was anxiously looking forward to the time when the sovereigns of Continental Europe should be his juniors， applied for contingents of troops from the States to which I was accredited. The Duchy of Mecklenburg-Schwerin was to furnish a regiment of 1800 men， and the other little States， such as Oldenburg and Mecklenburg-Strelitz， were to furnish regiments of less amount. All Europe was required to rise in arms to second the gigantic projects of the new sovereign. This demand for contingents， and the positive way in which the Emperor insisted upon them， gave rise to an immense correspondence， which， however， was unattended by any result. The notes and orders remained in the portfolios， and the contingents stayed at home.
M. Metternich， whose talent has since been so conspicuously displayed， had been for upwards of a year Ambassador from Austria to Paris. Even then he excelled in the art of guiding men's minds， and of turning to the advantage of his policy his external graces and the favour he acquired in the drawing-room. His father， a clever man， brought up in the old diplomatic school of Thugut and Kaunitz， had early accustomed him to the task of making other Governments believe， by means of agents， what might lead them into error and tend to the advantage of his own Government.
His manoeuvres tended to make Austria assume a discontented and haughty tone； and wishing， as she said， to secure her independence， she publicly declared her intention of protecting herself against any enterprise similar to those of which she had so often been the victim. This language， encouraged by the complete evacuation of Germany， and the war in Spain， the unfortunate issue of which was generally foreseen， was used--in time of peace between the two empires， and when France was not threatening war to Austria.
--[Metternich arrived in Paris as Ambassador on 4th August 1806， after Austria had been vanquished at Austerlitz. It does not seem probable， either from his views or his correspondence， that he advised the rash attempt of Austria to attack Napoleon by herself； compare Metternich tome 1. p. 69， on the mistake of Prussia in 1805 and 1806； see also tome ii. p. 221， "To provoke a war with France would be madness" (1st July 1808). On the other hand， the tone of his correspondence in 1808 seams calculated to make Austria believe that war was inevitable， and that her forces， "so inferior to those of France before the insurrection in Spain， will at least be equal to them immediately after that event" (tome ii. p. 808). What is curious is that Metternich's conduct towards Napoleon while Ambassador had led even such men as Duke Dalberg to believe that he was really so well disposed towards Napoleon as to serve his cause more than that of Austria.
M. Metternich， who had instructions from his Court， gave no satisfactory explanation of those circumstances to Napoleon， who immediately raised a conscription， and brought soldiers from Spain into Germany.
It was necessary， also， to come to an understanding with Russia， who， being engaged with her war in Finland and Turkey， appeared desirous neither to enter into alliance with Austria nor to afford her support.
